The Peace Palace Library has a wonderful new website. I highly recommend that you have a look at it. It can be found at the old address: www.peacepalacelibrary.nl, or if you are in a hurry: www.ppl.nl.

It has various brand new features, including a series of interviews. The first is an interview with Prof. Rosalyn Higgins. It is about her time as President of the International Court of Justice, the relationship between the Peace Palace Library and the Court, and the difference between men and women.

The second interview is with Prof. Yves Daudet, Emeritus Professor of the University Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne) and Secretary General of The Hague Academy of International Law. The discussion is about the Hague Academy, its relationship with the Peace Palace Library, and one of the paradoxes of modern life.

A new issue of the Goettingen Journal of International Law has just been published. It is available for free on the journal's homepage: www.gojil.eu. In Vol. 3 No. 3 (2011) GoJIL pays tribute to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and dedicates a GoJIL Focus to its legacy. Furthermore, the issue contains two articles about current developments in international law and an article discussing the legal status of the Holy See. The Göttingen Journal of International Law is highly recommended!

The Visiting Scholars Program at the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security is now accepting applications for 2012. The Australian Research Council (ARC) Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS) was established in 2007 under the ARC Centres of Excellence special initiative to boost policing and security research capacity in Australia amid the growing complexity and internationalisation of transnational crime in the post 9/11 environment. Headquartered at Griffith University, the ARC Centre partnership includes The Australian National University, The University of Queensland, and Charles Sturt University. CEPS has developed numerous partnerships with industry partners, and Australian and international researchers.

The CEPS Visiting Scholars Program supports domestic and international scholars wishing to undertake research at any of our four university nodes (Griffith University, The Australian National University, The University of Queensland and Charles Sturt University), as part of its mission to promote research. The program is highly competitive and aims to have approximately 8 - 10 visiting scholars each year.

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A one-year programme covering the main techniques and topics of the sociology of law for a Master of Arts degree (60 ECTS), accredited by the Università degli Studi di Milano and the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU). This MA is both a recognised self-standing qualification, and one which is accepted as a foundation for higher research degrees (PhD) by universities all over the world. The programme is in its 21st year, and previous graduates are now among the leading scholars or practitioners in their field.

A maximum of 20 applicants will be selected from all countries to benefit from the unique resources of the Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law, in the beautiful Basque country. The courses are taught in Oñati from September to March by visiting professors who are leading specialists on each topic (40 ECTS credits); and the degree is completed by an independent research project supervised by a specialist in socio-legal studies culminating in the writing of a dissertation submitted in September (20 ECTS credits).

The programme is unique, in that it is taught by visiting professors, meaning that the students are exposed to leading scholars in socio-legal studies, and we are able to offer a truly international programme. The majority of students continue onto PhDs, and with the programme now coming into its 23rd year, many of our graduates are now well-known scholars in their field. Thanks to the generous response of many friends of the Institute to our appeal for the Student Fund, we are also able to offer some financial assistance to students who would not otherwise be able to take the course. 

Further information can be found on the IISJ website.

The Faculty of Law of the University of Ghent (Belgium) has a vacancy for a full time (100%) tenure track professor in the department of Criminal Law and Criminology charged with academic teaching (mostly in Dutch), scientific research and carrying out scientific duties in the fields of criminology and sociology of law. The appointment will be made in the rank of lecturer, starting from 1 October 2012.

This full-time position is a tenure-track temporary appointment for a period of five years, at the end of which a tenure decision will be taken as full-time Professor in the rank of Senior Lecturer (hoofddocent), depending on an overall positive evaluation of the candidate.

Applications must be sent in duplicate by registered mail to the rector of Ghent University, Rectorate building, Sint-Pietersnieuwstraat 25, 9000 Ghent, Belgium, using the specific application form Autonomous Academic Staff (ZAP), including the necessary attestations of competence (copies of degrees), the 31st of January 2012 at the latest.
Further information about this vacancy and the application procedure can be found on the University of Ghent website.

Date: 10 January 2012
Time: 17.00-19.30
Organizer: JASON Institute, Peace Palace Library  
Venue: Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2, The Hague 

Fighting and Prosecuting Pirates: An Evening about Piracy Plus Book Launch of “Internationaal Publiekrecht als Wereldrecht” by Prof. Nico Schrijver 

The meeting's central theme is the international community’s efforts in combating and prosecuting pirates.

Commodore Michiel Hijmans will discuss the operational aspects of military operations to combat piracy, focusing on NATO’s counter-piracy operations. He was Commanding Officer of the Standing NATO Maritime Group, leading the operations `Ocean Shield´ (counter piracy) and `Operation Active Endeavour´ (counter terrorism).

Marten Zwanenburg will discuss the legal aspects of counter-piracy operations. He is Senior Legal Advisor at the Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands, and has a doctorate in international law from the University of Leiden.

Henny Baan will discuss the prosecution of arrested pirates. When prosecuting Somali pirates in the Netherlands, the Dutch criminal system is confronted with various novel questions of domestic and international criminal law. Henny Baan is a Dutch Public Prosecutor to the Rotterdam District Court, responsible for the first prosecution in Europe in modern times for the ancient crime of attempted "sea robbery.”

On the same evening, “Internationaal Publiekrecht als Wereldrecht” (published by Boom) will be offered to Dr. Bernard Bot, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador. Nico Schrijver, the author of the book, is Professor at Leiden University, Senator in the Dutch House of Parliament and President of the International Law Association. 

The Peace Palace Library Lecture Series consists of approximately four lectures a year about issues of international public law. Each lecture will start with a reception, followed by the lecture. The Lecture Series are open to everyone and are especially interesting for researchers and students, as well as diplomats, international civil servants, journalists and other professionals working in the field of international public law. 

Please register by sending an email to Otto Spijkers at o.spijkers@ppl.nl.

The University of Glasgow has announced a vacancy for a Lecturer in International Law. This is the fifth position at the university exclusively in international law. The new position is thus in line with the university's overall plan to strengthen its profile in international law, with particular emphasis on the issues of law and security.

 

The vacancy notice, with all the details, is here. Anyone interested in the position may also contact Professor Christian Tams at christian[dot]tams[at]glasgow[dot]ac[dot]uk.

The Research Project on Shared Responsibility in International Law (SHARES), carried out at the University of Amsterdam, explores the allocation of international responsibilities where multiple actors contribute to an international wrong. It seeks to uncover the extent and nature of the problem of scattering international responsibilities and to provide a fresh perspective on how the ever increasing interdependence in the international legal order, can be better matched with a proper system of shared responsibility. 

The Conference on Foundations of Shared Responsibility in International Law, organized on 17 and 18 November in Amsterdam, will explore fundamental and conceptual issues that explain the state of law, allow for identification of gaps and provide insights on possibilities for further development of the law pertaining to shared responsibility. The Conference will also be a first take on the findings of the SHARES project so far, and will allow for a confrontation with other competing and/or complementary approaches. 

The programme of the conference is available here. Registration for the conference is open. However, as seating is limited, we may not be able to accommodate all requests. Please wait for a confirmation of your registration before making any travel arrangements. For registration please contact Ingrid van Beek-Meijer at shares-fdr@uva.nl. 

Eleven International Publishing and The Peace Palace Library embarked on a unique pilot project which gives free access to all Eleven publications in BoomDoc Academic, the online publication platform of Boom Publishers The Hague and Eleven international Publishing. The pilot will last till 11-11-'11. 

Clients of the Peace Palace Library will enjoy full text access to all Eleven publications in Boomdoc Academic.

They will also be able to download all Eleven publications in PDF and/or order it as a paperback free of charge, as long as they access BoomDoc Academic at the Peace Palace Library. 

Paperbacks that have been ordered via BoomDoc can be picked up at the information desk of the Peace Palace Library within five days.  

By Otto Spijkers

A brand new issue of the Goettingen Journal of International Law is now available on the website of the journal. In Volume 3, No. 2 (2011), the editors have compiled nine great articles about questions and current developments in general public law, international criminal law, refugee law and the law of international organizations. These include an article on the politics of deformalization in international law, by my former colleague Jean d'Aspremont; an article on the myth of 'international crimes' by Mayeul Hiéramente, and an article on genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes’.

By Dov Jacobs

Cross-posted on Spreading the Jam 

 

Earlier this week, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) submitted, on behalf of the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, a communication  to the International Criminal Court requesting that an investigation be opened for Crimes against Humanity committed by high-level Vatican officials.

In a nutshell, the submission argues that there is evidence of widespread and systematic abuse (both rape and torture) of a civilian population by priests in a number of countries and that the Vatican, and more specifically Joseph Ratzinger, both in his former capacity as Prefect of the Congreation of the Doctrine of the Faith, and current capacity as Pope Benedict XVI, should be held liable for covering this up, even to the point of promoting it (this last point is a little ambiguous and I'll return to it later).

 

This idea has been floating around for a while now. Geoffrey Robertson published a book last year arguing for such an approach. I remain skeptical however and think that there are a number of difficulties with the submission.

 

As a preliminary remark, one should remember that the Prosecutor is under no obligation to proceed from here, neither to open a preliminary examination, nor, of course, to open a formal investigation. The submission by the CCR does not "trigger" the jurisdiction of the ICC, as would a referral by a State Party of the Security Council, and the OTP is not even under an obligation to respond to the submission (although it claims that, for reasons of transparency, it generally will "aim" to respond to communications).

 

I would like to comment on three aspects: jurisdiction, the scope of the situation, and finally on whether the crime is actually constituted.

 

 

• Jurisdiction

First of all, it should be pointed out that the Prosecutor, should it proceed with an investigation, would only be able to look into crimes that were committed after the entry into force of the Statute in July 2002. Moreover, he will only be able to look at alleged crimes that took place, either on the territory of a State Party or by a national of a State Party. In this sense, it explains why the Communication includes the United States and one alleged american perpetrator, to the extent that the crimes in the US could have been committed by nationals of State Parties and that the American Citizen might have committed crimes on the territory of State Parties.

 

 

• The scope of the situation

 

Second of all, the submission raises the question of the scope of the "situation" that would be the object of an investigation. Traditionally, situations have been expected to be limited in some way, especially from a territorial perspective. Up to now, this has been the case for all the situations looked into by the Court. The CCR submission, if it was followed would therefore be a first in the history of the Court, by defining a situation through a unity of crimes and alleged perpetrators exclusively, rather than through a territorial criteria. It should be pointed out that this is an implicit consequence of the reasoning of the CCR, because they don't actually explicitely deal with this issue. Three brief comments on this.

1) One should remember that the ICC Statute does not define what a situation is. Therefore, as I've discussed before in relation to the Libya Referral, any challenges to the scope of a situation faces this difficulty of having no statutory guidelines on which to base such a challenge. The case-law has suggested some limitations to the scope of a situation, but these are vague enough for anybody to argue that they could be extended to cover the events in the current submission.

2) It remains that there might be a difficulty with the submission when one considers not so much the concept of "situation" in general, but consider it in relation to the other ICC distinction, namely a "case". Indeed, I might not be able to define a situation, but what the CCR is describing in its communication certainly appears to me to be a "case": they identify a crime, the perpetrators and the mode of liabity. In this sense, the OTP, even should it accept a broader approach to a "situation", would be in violation of the Statute and the rights of the defense should it define the situation in the terms used by the CCR.

3) Which leaves the question open of how this situation would be phrased. One option would be to open a distinct investigation into each of the countries named by the CCR, but in practice, it would still require that it be shown that the crime is constituted based on a transnational policy.

 

 

• Is the alleged crime of "Crimes against Humanity" actually constituted? (and another rant on the confusion between HR and ICL...)

 

 

Which brings me to my third point : there is the major issue of whether Crimes against Humanity are indeed constituted. There is no doubt that the abuse in the catholic church has been widespread and systematic. Where the communication fails to convince, is on the organizational element required by the Elements of the Crimes in the following way:

"Attack directed against a civilian population"[...] is understood to mean a course of conduct [...] pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. [...] It is understood that “policy to commit such attack” requires that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population.

 

A footnote to this paragraph specifies that:

 

A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be implemented by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organizational action

 

How does this apply to the current situation? For one, no one seems to be arguing that the Vatican set up an actual policy to perpetrate widespread and systematic abuse against persons in the care of priests. It is their "deliberate failure to take action" which is put forward. However, even if the conduct of Church authorities is subject to criticism, I think it falls short of showing that it was "consciously aimed at encouraging such attack". In this sense, when the communication says that the Vatican has been dealing with such situations in ways that ensured such violence would continue", I think it still does not establish intent, even by omission.

 

In relation to this, the reasoning of the CCR is even more confusing as regards the modes of liability put forward. Indeed, the CCR is clearly confusing the constitutive elements of the crime and the modes of liability. Let me explain. The CCR considers three possible modes of liability: superior responsibility (Article 28), contribution (25(3)(d)) and aiding and abetting (25(3)(c)). All these modes of liability have in common to be "subsidiary" to the main crime, which still has to be constituted. But the CCR does not do that. It would have to show that independently of the Vatican, its officials are claimed to "only" be the accomplice, the priests that committed the abuse acted under a plan or policy that they had set up, which, again, is not argued here. Indeed, without an established Vatican policy there is nothing that links the individual cases of abuse in a sufficiently organisational way to constitute a crime against humanity.

 

The consequence of this is that the Vatican officials are either responsible for "direct" commission under 25(3)(a), or not responsible at all. But they cannot be held complicit for a crime that is not constituted independently  of them. Which leaves us with one, arguably progressive, but at least coherent way of putting the case forward. It is the systematic cover up of this widespread abuse that constitutes the crime against humanity, not the abuse itself. This would mirror the development under human rights law of positive obligations, whereby if the State does not prevent the violation of a right under the ECHR, for example, by a third party, it is held responsible for the violation of that right. This reasoning would at least solve the issue of the modes of liability and the constitution of the crime.

 

However, and regular readers of this blog won't be surprised, I am not in favour of such an approach. This communication illustrates once again the slow (and apparently inevitable) blurring of the line between human rights and international criminal law. For me, widespread and systematic human rights violations do not necessarily constitute crimes under international law. These are related, but conceptually distinct domains that should remain distinct. In relation to this, it is unsurprising that the Communication relies heavily on the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber decision that authorized the opening of the investigation in the Kenya situation. I criticised it at the time, agreeing with the dissenting opinion of Judge Kaul, for broadening too much the scope of Crimes against Humanity. I expressed similar doubts in relation to the reference to Crimes against Humanity in the Libyan Arrest warrants. In a way, you can't blame the CCR for its communication. It's a direct consequence of all-encompassing conceptually blurred approach to crimes against humanity by the ICC judges themselves that is to blame. The conduct of the Church in past decades is certainly appalling, requires the utmost attention and should be dealt with accordingly, but, but I remain convinced that the ICC is not the right forum.

 

Hopefully, the Prosecutor and judges will not fall victim once again to the "boy scout mentality", which leads them to systematically want to save the world with two twigs and a piece of rope, even if someone else might have a far better set of tools...

 

UPDATE: Of course, another angle to approach this is from a PR perspective. It is clearly the ambition of the CCR to get media attention over the issue. This plays into the general trend of trying to get the ICC involved in every situation, to get some news coverage. Indeed, no situation seems to escape this trend (Palestine, Syria, Tunisia...). As discussed above, I disagree with this conceptually, but I have to admit that it is certainly effective. Thanks Joe for pointing this out.

• Date: 11 October 2011
• Time: 17.30-19.30 (lecture starts at 18.00)
• Organizer: Peace Palace Library
• Venue: Peace Palace Library, Historic Reading Room, Carnegieplein 2, The Hague

In 1961, Adolf Eichmann (1906-1962), a former SS-Obersturmbannführer, was accused, before a court in Jerusalem, of helping Hitler in his plan to exterminate the Jews in the Second World War. He was found guilty on all charges and subsequently hanged in a prison near Tel Aviv in June 1962. The trial was omnipresent in Israeli and global politics, media and academic discussions. Especially due to the work of Hannah Ahrendt, Eichmann became known as the embodiment of the banality of evil, the Schreibtischmörderer who slavishly and uncritically carried out orders from the top of the bureaucracy.

Documents recently disclosed and studied by Dr. Birn shed some interesting new light on the case. They give the impression that the Israeli prosecutor in the Eichmann case was ill-prepared, and that his investigation had significant gaps.

Professor Thomas Mertens will present his recently published book on the Eichmann trial and the controversial reporting by Hannah Arendt. 

Professor Harmen van der Wilt will compare the Eichmann trial with standards and the practice of modern day prosecutions.  

The Peace Palace Library Lecture Series consists of approximately four lectures a year about issues of international public law. Each lecture will start with a small reception in the library’s new reading room, followed by the lecture in the historical reading room. The Lecture Series are open to everyone and are especially interesting for researchers and students, as well as diplomats, international civil servants, journalists and other professionals working in the field of international public law.

Please register by sending an email to Otto Spijkers at o.spijkers@ppl.nl. We hope to see you there!   

Call for applications for a 4 year salaried Doctoral position in international humanitarian law at Lund University, Sweden, focusing on ‘The Impact of Military Training Practices on Targeting Law’.
 
Salaried doctoral candidate in International Humanitarian Law
 
Starting 1 September, applications are invited for a salaried doctoral position in public international law within the framework of a project on ‘The Impact of Military Training Practices on Targeting Law’. The project is financed by a grant of the Ragnar Söderberg Foundation. In the Nordic context, the Faculty of Law hosts one of the most dynamic research environments in international law, with a large group of researchers exploring the interaction of theory and empiry in this field.

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By Otto Spijkers

On Wednesday 12 October 2011 I will defend my dissertation at the Academy Building of Leiden Univeristy, located at Rapenburg 67-73, Leiden. The book The United Nations, the Evolution of Global Values and International Law describes how moral values have determined the founding of the United Nations Organization in 1945 and the evolution of its purposes, principles and policies since then. It will be published by Intersentia in the School of Human Rights Research Series. 

A detailed examination of the proceedings of the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco demonstrates that the drafting of the United Nations Charter was significantly influenced by global moral values, i.e. globally shared beliefs distinguishing right from wrong, good from bad, and the current from a preferable state-of-the-world. A common desire to eradicate war, poverty, inhuman treatment, and to halt the exploitation of peoples, has led to an affirmation of the values of peace and security, social progress and development, human dignity and the self-determination of all peoples. All these values ended up in the UN Charter. The book further analyzes how the United Nations, and especially its General Assembly, has continued to influence the maturing of global morality through contributions to the values-debate, and to the translation of these values into the language of international law, including the law on the use of force, sustainable development, human rights and the right to self-determination.

By Tobias Thienel

My co-blogger Otto has a post at the blog of the Peace Palace Library, announcing and discussing the English version of the Srebrenica judgments in the Court of Appeal in The Hague. The two judgment, which are nearly identical, are available here; Otto's post explains the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, as well as that of the court below (which was overruled).

 

I will now take the opportunity to offer a very brief comparison between the Dutch case and the treatment of the attribution issue by the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (GC). As will be recalled, Al-Jedda concerned the attribution of measures of internment in Iraq to the UN or to the armed forces of the UK, whereas the Srebrenica cases in The Hague were about liability for the failure of Dutch peace-keeping forces to protect Bosnian civilians from the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995.

 

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By Tobias Thienel

The Pinochet line of cases in the English courts, and particularly in the UK House of Lords, will be reasonably familiar to most international lawyers. Whether rightly or wrongly, they stand for important propositions as to the immunity of foreign officials, chief among which was the proposition that immunity was unavailable for acts of torture. (I say 'rightly or wrongly', because the central holding of those cases was not as broad as many thought at the time: see Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC 270, paras 86 et seq).

 

Those cases are now joined by a new fascinating case on various issues of immunity in the English High Court: Bat v Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court [2011] EWHC 2029 (Admin) concerned a remarkable set of facts, and culminated in an important holding, with many interesting remarks along the way.

 

The facts, in broad outline, were these: The investigating judge at the German Federal (i.e., supreme) Court had issued a European Arrest Warrant against a Mr Khurts Bat on roughly the following charges: Mr Khurts Bat, the Head of the Office of National Security of Mongolia, was alleged to have abducted a Mongolian national from Le Havre in France, to have taken him to Berlin and then to have had him flown out to Mongolia, where the abducted person was imprisoned. The scenario, then, was reasonably similar to that in the famous Alvarez-Machain case (see Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)).

 

On the basis of this European Arrest Warrant, Mr Khurts Bat was arrested in London, and his extradition to Germany was approved at first instance by a Magistrates' Court. However, Mr Khurts Bat contested his extradition on the grounds of sovereign immunity. In a pointer to the importance of the case, his side - more precisely, the Mongolian government - was represented by no less a figure than Sir Elihu Lauterpacht QC. The Foreign Office, as an interested party, was represented by Sir Michael Wood QC.

 

The Court dismissed all claims to immunity. Most remarkably, it held that immunity ratione materiae - the immunity available to all present and former officials with respect to their official acts - was unavailable where the crimes at issue were alleged to have been committed in the forum state (in this case, Germany).

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By Tobias Thienel

Following up on my previous post on today's trio of important cases from Strasbourg, I will now offer some further thoughts - still far from exhaustive - on the three judgments. Of course, my pointer to EJIL:Talk (where Marko Milanovic's thoughts are expected) remains.

 

As for Al-Skeini, I think it can be predicted with some confidence that this case will stand as one of the most important cases on the extra-territorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights. Whether it can eclipse Bankovic - which it cites a great deal - remains to be seen and is a little doubtful. However, Al-Skeini is one of the few cases that give some impression of what 'effective control' means. Certainly, the judgment does not actually do much to actually define the concept, but its outcome is telling. If the somewhat precarious grasp that the British Army had on events in Basra at the relevant time is sufficient (if taken with the role of the UK as an occupying power), then the test is clearly less demanding than has occasionally been thought. True, the fleeting presence of the odd military patrol or aircraft may not be enough (cf. Issa and Others v Turkey; Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others), but the facts in Al-Skeini - regarding the general state of affairs and the specific situations in which the shootings occurred - were not all that much stronger. It may be, certainly, that the fact of military occupation in the sense of international humanitarian law weighed heavily with the Court (as it has with Judge Bonello), but 'effective control' remains, even on the approach of the Court, above all a factual concept.

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By Tobias Thienel

It's a good day for human rights law because the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has today delivered its judgments in Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom, Al-Jedda v United Kingdom and Bayatyan v Armenia. In all these cases, the applicants have now won, after losing everywhere else on the way to the Grand Chamber. I, for one, did not necessarily expect that.

 

I will have something more to say on these cases later, and readers are advised - though no doubt unnecessarily - to turn to EJIL:Talk where Marko Milanovic is sure to have enlightening comments fairly soon. Suffice it to say here and at this stage that

- in Al-Skeini the Grand Chamber very quickly demolished the reasoning of the House of Lords (and the High Court before it) in holding that the European espace juridique of the Convention (as mentioned in para 80 of Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others) was in no way a limit to the extraterritorial application of the ECHR. This is clearly right. I do not begin to believe that the Court was influenced by my article on this question (the works of Ralph Wilde and Marko Milanovic may be another matter), but it is good to be proved right by high authority.

- also in Al-Skeini, the Court found that the UK had had effective control for the purposes of Article 1 because, as an occupying power, it had exercised some of the powers of the local state. The Court is not entirely clear whether it applied the model of 'jurisdiction over territory' or of 'jurisdiction over a person', but it seems that it was the latter, if somewhat curiously set in a general situation of some control over territory.

- still in Al-Skeini, it is regrettable that the Court has not followed the clear line taken by Judge Bonello in his - beautiful! - concurring opinion. It has spoken of 'effective control' as the decisive matter, but in rehearsing other bases of extraterritorial application has stuck to the strange view that the powers of diplomatic agents and the like under general international law were somehow decisive as well. This should be a matter of control as in all other cases.

- in Al-Jedda, the Court simply read down the Security Council resolutions that were said to have authorised the applicant's detention. In doingso, it quite properly approved a principle of construction by which SC resolutions should, where possible, be read to comply with human rights law. Only Judge Poalelungi found this impossible. The majority avoided the Article 103 point, but the sole dissenting Judge would have followed the House of Lords on this matter.

- finally, in Bayatyan, the Court ruled in favour of a right of conscientious objection under Article 9 of the ECHR. It overruled the (small) Chamber and a good body of Commission case law in holding that Article 4 (3) (b) had nothing to say about this. This meant that the interesting methodological point about the limits of the 'living instrument approach' in the face of clear implications from the wording (as to which see this previous post) did not arise.

By Otto Spijkers

On the website of the Dutch Courts, you will find, in a few days, the English translation of the case in which the State of the Netherlands is held responsible for the death of three Muslim men after the fall of Srebrenica. This is the appeals judgment in a case I commented upon earlier, when I wrote how the District Court ruled that acts of Dutchbat had to be attributed to the United Nations and not to the Netherlands. Much to the surprise of everyone involved, the Appeals Court actually now ruled in favour of the defendants. It believed with the defendants that the State of the Netherlands had 'effective control' over the peacekeepers at the relevant times and for the relevant acts. The District Court believed that 'overall control' was decisive, and that the United Nations had such control at all relevant times. The Appeals Court applied a much stricter threshold in order to determine the attribution question: it looked at who had 'effective control.'

This is the most interesting part of the Judgment (in Dutch, English translation will follow in a few days):

5. Toerekening van het optreden van Dutchbat; de grieven 3-9 en 11-13

5.1  De grieven 3-9 en 11-13 stellen de vraag aan de orde of het handelen of nalaten (hierna ook wel: het optreden) van Dutchbat dat Mustafic c.s. aan de Staat verwijten, moet worden toegerekend aan de VN (opvatting Staat en rechtbank) of aan de Staat (opvatting Mustafic c.s.), waarbij Mustafic c.s. het ook mogelijk achten dat dit optreden zowel aan de VN als de Staat wordt toegerekend.

5.2  Mustafic c.s. betogen (grief 4) primair dat de Nederlandse militairen met Mustafic een beschermingsovereenkomst zijn aangegaan, doordat zij Mustafic herhaaldelijk hebben laten weten dat hij op de lijst met lokaal personeel stond en hem aldus uit naam van de Staat hebben aangeboden dat hij op de compound kon blijven, welk aanbod Mustafic heeft geaccepteerd. Op deze overeenkomst is volgens Mustafic c.s. op grond van art. 4 lid 1 van het Verdrag dat van toepassing is op overeenkomsten van 19 juni 1980 (EVO) Nederlands recht van toepassing. In de nakoming van deze overeenkomst, die een bijzondere plicht tot bescherming inhield, zijn de Nederlandse militairen tekortgeschoten, omdat zij Mustafic te kennen hebben gegeven dat hij de compound moest verlaten. Voor deze tekortkoming in de nakoming van de overeenkomst door de Nederlandse militairen is de Staat als werkgever aansprakelijk. Subsidiair, als het hof geen schending van de beschermingsovereenkomst zou aannemen, is de Staat aansprakelijk op grond van onrechtmatige daad. Toerekening van deze onrechtmatige daad moet niet naar regels van internationaal gewoonterecht maar naar nationaal Bosnisch recht plaatsvinden. Mustafic c.s. voeren daartoe aan dat partijen het er over eens zijn dat de rechtsverhouding uit onrechtmatige daad tussen Mustafic en de Staat wordt beheerst door het recht van Bosnië-Herzegovina. Volgens Mustafic c.s. werkt internationaal gewoonterecht niet, althans niet rechtstreeks, door in het recht van Bosnië-Herzegovina. Dit betekent volgens Mustafic c.s. dat op grond van de Wet conflictenrecht onrechtmatige daad (WCOD) op de rechtsverhouding uit onrechtmatige daad tussen Mustafic en de Staat het Bosnische recht van toepassing is. De WCOD kent als mogelijk toepasselijk recht slechts het recht van een staat en niet internationaal (gewoonte)recht, aldus Mustafic c.s..

5.3.1  Dit betoog faalt. Het hof stelt voorop dat de door Mustafic c.s. gestelde feiten niet de conclusie kunnen dragen dat tussen Mustafic en de Staat een 'beschermingsovereenkomst' tot stand is gekomen. Ook indien het zo was dat de naam van Mustafic op de 'lijst van 29' voorkwam, dat hem dit was meegedeeld en dat zowel de leiding van Dutchbat als Mustafic er op basis daarvan van uitgingen dat Mustafic op de compound mocht blijven en een speciale bescherming zou genieten, betekent dit nog niet dat ook een overeenkomst van die inhoud tot stand is gekomen, omdat uit niets blijkt dat Dutchbat dan wel de Staat ook een juridisch bindende verplichting daartoe jegens Mustafic op zich heeft willen nemen en dat ligt gezien de omstandigheden ook niet voor de hand. Mustafic mocht de gang van zaken in redelijkheid ook niet zo begrijpen dat de Staat een dergelijke overeenkomst wel met hem wilde sluiten.

5.3.2   Wat betreft de toerekening van de gestelde onrechtmatige daad is het hof van oordeel dat het betoog van Mustafic c.s., dat toerekening van deze onrechtmatige daad naar regels van nationaal Bosnisch recht moet plaatsvinden, faalt. Het gaat hier niet om de vraag of militairen van Dutchbat jegens Mustafic onrechtmatig hebben gehandeld, maar om de vraag of, op grond van een al dan niet tussen de Staat en de VN gesloten overeenkomst (of die overeenkomst is gesloten, althans wat deze inhoudt, is onderwerp van grief 5) tot het ter beschikking stellen van troepen, het optreden van deze militairen die aan de VN ter beschikking zijn gesteld moet worden toegerekend aan de Staat, de VN of eventueel aan beide. De vraag of een dergelijke overeenkomst tussen een soevereine staat en een internationale organisatie als de VN, die beide rechtspersonen onder internationaal recht zijn, is gesloten, wat deze inhoudt en welke gevolgen deze heeft, ook voor de vraag welke partij civielrechtelijk voor het optreden van Dutchbat aansprakelijk is, moet beoordeeld worden naar internationaal recht. Daarbij is niet van belang dat internationaal recht niet rechtstreeks doorwerkt in het nationale recht van Bosnië-Herzegovina.

5.4  Ook echter indien de toerekening van het optreden van Dutchbat uitsluitend naar nationaal recht (in dit geval het recht van Bosnië-Herzegovina) moet worden beoordeeld slaagt de grief niet. Ook in dat geval doet zich immers de vraag voor welke partij in de gegeven context, waarbij een staat troepen ter beschikking stelt aan de VN in het kader van een operatie onder hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest van de VN, civielrechtelijk kan worden aangesproken voor het optreden van die troepen. Aangezien Mustafic c.s. niet stellen en het hof uit het advies van het Internationaal Juridisch instituut ook niet is gebleken dat het recht van Bosnië-Herzegovina voor die situatie een specifieke regel bevat, ligt het voor de hand en acht het hof het in overeenstemming met het Bosnische recht dat bij de beantwoording van voormelde vraag aansluiting wordt gezocht bij het internationale recht op grond waarvan de troepen aan de VN ter beschikking zijn gesteld.

5.5  De Staat heeft er naar aanleiding van grief 4 op gewezen dat hij in eerste aanleg heeft aangevoerd dat het optreden van Dutchbat in Bosnië-Herzegovina uitsluitend aan de hand van het volkenrecht en dus niet aan de hand van enig nationaal recht moet worden beoordeeld, en dat hij dat standpunt in hoger beroep handhaaft. Het hof is van oordeel dat dit standpunt onjuist is. Het optreden van Dutchbat in Bosnië-Herzegovina is, behoudens de werking van eventuele immuniteiten, die zich in dit geval ten aanzien van de Staat niet voordoen, niet onttrokken aan de werking van het nationale recht van dat land en kan in beginsel aanleiding geven tot (onder meer) aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad naar Bosnisch recht. De Commissie van Advies inzake Volkenrechtelijke Vraagstukken gaat er in haar door de Staat in het geding gebrachte rapport (productie 29 Staat) ook van uit dat zodanige aansprakelijkheid kan ontstaan (paragraaf 2.5.2). Overigens hebben Mustafic c.s. ook schending van internationaalrechtelijke normen aan hun vorderingen ten grondslag gelegd. Zoals hierna zal blijken leidt toetsing aan deze laatste normen niet tot een wezenlijk andere beoordeling dan bij een toetsing aan alleen het recht van Bosnië-Herzegovina. Dit betekent dat de Staat bij dit betoog ook geen belang heeft.

5.6  Met grief 5 komen Mustafic c.s. op tegen het oordeel van de rechtbank dat deelneming aan een vredesoperatie van de VN op basis van hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest overdracht van 'command and control' over de ter beschikking gestelde troepen aan de VN impliceert. Volgens Mustafic c.s. kan 'command and control' alleen door een expliciete handeling op grond van een overeenkomst worden overgedragen en is daarvan in dit geval geen sprake. De Staat heeft onvoldoende gesteld, laat staan bewezen, dat een dergelijke overdracht van 'command and control' heeft plaatsgevonden. Dit betekent volgens Mustafic c.s. dat de onrechtmatige gedragingen van Dutchbat aan de Staat moeten worden toegerekend.

5.7  De grief faalt, aangezien een dergelijke overeenkomst besloten ligt in de gang van zaken zoals hiervoor onder 2.10 beschreven. Daaruit blijkt immers dat namens de Nederlandse regering aan de militair adviseur van de Secretaris-Generaal van de VN en vervolgens aan de Secretaris-Generaal zelf een bataljon van de Luchtmobiele Brigade is aangeboden ten behoeve van de uitvoering van met name Resolutie 836 en dat dit aanbod door de Secretaris-Generaal is aanvaard. Voor een dergelijke overeenkomst gelden geen bijzondere vormvereisten en dat voeren Mustafic c.s. ook niet aan. De aldus tot stand gekomen overeenkomst kan in redelijkheid niet anders worden verstaan dan dat het de bedoeling van partijen was dat het Nederlandse bataljon in de bevelstructuur van de VN zou komen te functioneren en dus waar het betreft de uitvoering van de vredesoperatie onder het uiteindelijke gezag van de Veiligheidsraad zou worden geplaatst. In Resolution 743 (1992) (productie 13 Staat) van de Veiligheidsraad, waarbij UNPROFOR in het leven werd geroepen, is immers bepaald dat UNPROFOR onder de 'authority' van de Veiligheidsraad zou komen te staan. Dit wordt bevestigd doordat Dutchbat vervolgens ook daadwerkelijk onder bevel van de VN is geplaatst en als zodanig heeft gefunctioneerd. Het hof concludeert dan ook dat Dutchbat onder het bevel van de VN is geplaatst. Of dit ook betekent dat 'command and control' aan de VN is overgedragen en wat daar precies onder moet worden verstaan kan in het midden blijven omdat, zoals hierna zal blijken, Mustafic c.s. terecht aanvoeren dat het voor toerekening beslissende criterium niet is wie 'command and control' uitoefende maar wie 'effective control' bezat.

5.8  In grief 9 voeren Mustafic c.s. aan dat het criterium voor toerekening van het optreden van Dutchbat aan de VN dan wel de Staat de vraag is wie 'effective control' had en niet, zoals de rechtbank heeft aangenomen, wie 'command and control' uitoefende. De grief is gegrond. In de volkenrechtelijke literatuur als ook in het werk van de ILC wordt algemeen de opvatting aanvaard dat indien een Staat troepen ter beschikking stelt aan de VN voor het uitvoeren van een vredesmissie, de vraag aan wie een specifiek optreden van dergelijke troepen moet worden toegerekend afhankelijk is van de vraag wie van beide 'effective control' heeft over het desbetreffende optreden. Vgl. M. Hirsch, The Resposibility of International Organizations Towards Third Parties: Some Basic Principles (1995) p. 64; F. Messineo, NILR 2009 p. 41-42; A. Sari, Human Rights Law Review 2008 p. 164; T. Dannenbaum, Harvard International Law Journal 2010 p. 140-141. Deze opvatting heeft tevens uitdrukking gevonden in the draft articles on the Responsibility of international organizations van de ILC, waarvan Article 6 luidt:

"The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that is placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct."

Hoewel deze bepaling strikt genomen 'effective control' alleen noemt in relatie tot toerekening aan de 'inlenende' internationale organisatie, wordt aangenomen dat hetzelfde criterium geldt voor de vraag of het optreden van troepen moet worden toegerekend aan de Staat die deze ter beschikking heeft gesteld.

5.9  De vraag of de Staat 'effective control' had over het optreden van Dutchbat dat Mustafic c.s. aan hun vordering ten grondslag leggen, moet worden beantwoord aan de hand van de omstandigheden van het geval. Daarbij komt niet alleen betekenis toe aan de vraag of dat optreden de uitvoering vormde van een door de VN of de Staat gegeven, specifieke instructie, maar ook aan de vraag of, indien een dergelijke specifieke instructie ontbreekt, de VN of de Staat het in zijn macht had het desbetreffende optreden te voorkomen. Het hof neemt daarnaast tot uitgangspunt dat algemeen aanvaard wordt dat het mogelijk is dat meer dan één partij 'effective control' heeft zodat niet uitgesloten is dat toepassing van dit criterium er toe leidt dat toerekening aan meer dan één partij kan plaatsvinden. Dit brengt het hof er toe alleen te onderzoeken of de Staat 'effective control' uitoefende over het verweten optreden en in het midden te laten of ook de VN 'effective control' bezat.

5.10  Bij toepassing van het 'effective control' criterium is van belang dat niet in geschil is dat de troepenleverende staat zeggenschap behoudt over personele aangelegenheden van de ter beschikking gestelde militairen, die bij die staat in dienst zijn en blijven, alsmede de bevoegdheid deze militairen disciplinair en strafrechtelijk te straffen. Evenmin is in geschil dat de troepenleverende staat te allen tijde de bevoegdheid houdt de troepen terug te trekken en deelname aan de operatie te staken.

5.11  Het hof acht voorts van belang dat de context waarin het verweten optreden van Dutchbat zich heeft afgespeeld in een belangrijk opzicht verschilt van de normale situatie waarin door een staat ter beschikking gestelde troepen onder bevel van de VN functioneren, zoals aan de orde was in de zaken Behrami v. France, no. 71412/01 en Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, no. 78166/01 van het EHRM (LJN: BB 7360 en BB 3180). Na 11 juli 1995 was de missie om Srebrenica te beschermen mislukt. Srebrenica was die dag gevallen en er was geen sprake meer van dat Dutchbat, of UNPROFOR in een andere samenstelling, de missie zou voortzetten of hervatten. Dat Resolutie 1004 (1995) (zie hiervoor onder 2.25) tot enig bevel aan Dutchbat heeft geleid om haar posities in en rond Srebrenica weer in te nemen blijkt niet, het leger van de Bosnische Serviërs heeft ook geen gehoor gegeven aan de in de resolutie gedane oproep zich uit Srebrenica terug te trekken. Integendeel, in de avond van 11 juli 1995 is in het overleg tussen de Nederlandse chef Defensiestaf Van den Breemen, plaatsvervangend bevelhebber Van Baal en generaal Janvier geconstateerd dat verder geweld gebruiken geen enkele zin had; zie Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Srebrenica, verhoren p. 736 (brief van Van den Breemen). Het ging er nog slechts om Dutchbat en de vluchtelingen te evacueren, en dit op een zodanige manier te doen dat de vluchtelingen niet onbeschermd zouden blijven. Zoals Van Baal het uitdrukte (proces-verbaal voorlopig getuigenverhoor p. 3):

"Liefst gezamenlijk er uit, niet Dutchbat als eerste, wellicht na elkaar maar wel onder begeleiding van Dutchbat."

en tegenover de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie (verhoren p. 344):

"Op basis daarvan zijn in goed overleg met generaal Janvier een aantal afspraken gemaakt. Dutchbat zou met het bataljon evacueren. Het evacueren van 27.000 mensen was een majeure operatie."

Van den Breemen schreef aan de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie (verhoren p. 736):

"Er moest dus een staakt het vuren komen. Dutchbat blijft; humanitaire hulp; voorbereiden evacuatie. Dit alles had de porté gezien de humanitaire toestand en ook de dreiging van de Serven, die elk moment alles konden doen, dat uiteindelijk de vluchtelingen alsmede Dutchbat zouden moeten evacueren."

5.12  Het hof kan het resultaat van het overleg van Janvier, Van den Breemen en Van Baal niet anders begrijpen dan dat het besluit tot de evacuatie van Dutchbat en de vluchtelingen in feite in onderling overleg tussen Janvier namens de VN enerzijds en Van den Breemen en Van Baal namens de Nederlandse regering anderzijds tot stand is gekomen. Het hof acht het ook onaannemelijk dat twee van de hoogste Nederlandse militairen alleen naar Zagreb waren gekomen om te vernemen wat generaal Janvier, na het vernemen van hun wensen, over de evacuatie zou beslissen. Het hof begrijpt de achtergrond van het overleg die avond zo dat, gezien de zorgen die in Den Haag bestonden over de veiligheid van zowel Dutchbat als de vluchtelingen, in de praktijk alleen een besluit over evacuatie kon worden genomen waarmee zowel Den Haag als (de Force Commander van) de VN instemden. Dat ook door Gobillard en Nicolai tot evacuatie werd besloten doet aan het voorgaande niet af, aangezien doorslaggevend moet zijn wat op het hoogste niveau werd besloten. Kennelijk zagen zowel de VN als de Nederlandse regering dit besluit als zo belangrijk dat het een zaak was van de Force Commander Janvier en twee van de hoogste Nederlandse militairen. Aan die besluitvorming op het hoogste niveau heeft de Nederlandse regering deelgenomen. Overigens blijkt uit de verklaring van Nicolai tijdens het voorlopig getuigenverhoor dat het in Sarajevo genomen besluit alleen betrekking had op de evacuatie van de vluchtelingen, niet op de evacuatie van Dutchbat.

5.13  Generaal Nicolai heeft tijdens het voorlopig getuigenverhoor (proces-verbaal p. 2) het volgende verklaard over de aan het proces-verbaal van zijn verhoor gehechte instructie van 13 juli 1995, waar in paragraaf 8 Nicolai als "gevolmachtigd onderhandelaar namens NL Government en UNPROFOR" wordt aangeduid:

"Het was een kantelmoment; de missie van Dutchbat was afgelopen en we gingen ons richten op het terughalen van het bataljon naar Nederland. Dat is op zichzelf mede een nationale aangelegenheid, maar daarnaast waren er nog VN belangen en daarom was ik tevens voor UNPROFOR gevolmachtigde. Daarbij had ik dus een beetje een dubbelrol.

In dit geval ging het wat verder. Normaal gesproken kreeg ik geen instructies uit Nederland, maar alleen van de VN. Op dit moment had ook Nederland inspraak. Deze order heb ik gefaxt aan de landmachtstaf en ook aan het DCBC op de 13e in de loop van de dag met de vraag of de Nederlandse overheid hiermee kon leven. (...) De evacuatie van de Bosnische bevolking was op dat moment achter de rug."

Nicolai heeft verder verklaard (proces-verbaal p. 6):

&quoten Haag heeft mij gebeld, omdat Den Haag zich zorgen maakte over het lot van de mannen en daarom moesten wij ervoor zorgen dat ze in ieder geval niet als aparte groep behandeld zouden worden. Ik heb gezegd dat wij een andere prioriteitsvolgorde hadden en hier eigenlijk geen rekening mee hadden gehouden, maar dat ik het door zou geven aan Karremans. Vervolgens heeft Karremans verteld dat het eigenlijk geen relevant probleem was, omdat er nauwelijks mannen waren. In mijn ogen zou het totaal anders [het hof leest: zijn] als de VN het transport regelde en niet de Serven. Dit maakt niet uit, want als de Nederlandse regering zoiets zegt dan voer je dat als militair uit. Aan het eind van de ochtend van de 12e werd mij duidelijk dat de Serven het transport zouden regelen."

5.14  Toenmalig minister van Defensie Voorhoeve heeft als getuige verklaard (proces-verbaal p. 6):

"Mijn telefoongesprek op 12 juli met Karremans vond ongeveer om ongeveer acht uur 's ochtends plaats. Op basis van de daarvoor gevoerde gesprekken heb ik Karremans gezegd redt wat er valt te redden."

5.15  Naar aanleiding van pagina 206 van de aan het proces-verbaal van het voorlopig getuigenverhoor gehechte productie 4 (het verhoor door de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie, hof) werd Voorhoeve over het onderwerp &quotubbelrol van de heer Nicolai, vertegenwoordiger van de VN en Nederland" de volgende vraag gesteld (proces-verbaal voorlopig getuigenverhoor p. 8):

"U zei dat de VN bevelslijn niet functioneerde, wat is het verband tussen de dubbelrol van Nicolai en het niet functioneren van de VN bevelslijn?"

Voorhoeve antwoordde:

"Er was geen direct verband. Mijn constatering dat de bevelslijn niet werkte was gebaseerd op een lange periode, een jaar lang, van waarnemen van het niet functioneren van bepaalde onderdelen in met name de bevelsstructuur. Het aanwijzen van de hoogste nationale militair is gebruikelijk, ook in vredesoperaties die goed verlopen. Ik weet niet of ik de 11e aan kolonel Brantz mijn zorg heb geuit over de moslimmannen. Ik herinner me dat het gesprek ging over de vluchtelingen, de bevolking van Srebrenica."

In de bedoelde productie 4 (het verhoor van Voorhoeve door de Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie, p. 207), valt te lezen:

&quote heer Rehwinkel: Hoe kon de heer Nicolai het in de fax met richtlijnen over zichzelf hebben als de gevolmachtigd onderhandelaar namens Nederland? Hoe kon in de brief aan Mladic sprake zijn van een message from the authorities of the Netherlands?

De heer Voorhoeve: Omdat de heer Nicolai door de omstandigheden een dubbelfunctie kreeg. Hij was de hoogste in rang van alle in de UNPROFOR-organisatie werkende militairen die dicht bij het probleem zaten. De situatie in Srebrenica viel onder UNPROFOR Sarajevo. Het was logisch dat Nederlandse zorgen over de situatie aan de heer Nicolai werden meegedeeld."

5.16  Uit hetgeen hiervoor onder 2.30 en 2.31 is vastgesteld blijkt voorts dat Karremans instructies over de evacuatie kreeg die mede werden gegeven namens Nicolai in zijn hoedanigheid van "gevolmachtigd onderhandelaar namens NL Government en UNPROFOR", dus mede namens de Nederlandse regering. Karremans begreep dat ook zij, gezien zijn daarop volgende fax aan Mladic waarin hij schreef:

"(...) I did receive a message from the authorities of the Netherlands thru HQ UNPROFOR in SARAJEVO concerning the evacuation of Dutchbat. I have been ordered (...)".

        (onderstreping hof)

5.17  Op basis van het voorgaande concludeert het hof het volgende. Op 11 juli 1995 is door de VN en de Nederlandse regering besloten Dutchbat met de vluchtelingen te evacueren. Dit impliceerde dat Dutchbat binnen afzienbare termijn, nadat de evacuatie zou zijn voltooid, zou worden teruggetrokken naar Nederland. Vanaf 11 juli 1995 trad een overgangsperiode in, waarin de zaken in Potocari werden afgewikkeld. Een belangrijk onderdeel van de afwikkeling vormde de hulp aan en de evacuatie van de vluchtelingen. Hoewel, zoals Van Baal tijdens het voorlopig getuigenverhoor heeft verklaard (proces-verbaal p. 2), Dutchbat op dat moment nog niet aan UNPF werd onttrokken, kon er geen misverstand over bestaan dat dit na de evacuatie wel zou gebeuren. Nergens in de stukken wordt gesuggereerd dat Dutchbat na evacuatie binnen UNPF nog een rol te vervullen zou krijgen. Het onderscheid dat de rechtbank maakt tussen het aan Nederland verblijvende recht om Dutchbat uit Bosnië-Herzegovina terug te trekken en het recht van de VN om te beslissen over evacuatie van de eenheden van UNPROFOR uit Srebrenica is formeel juist, maar doet onvoldoende recht aan het feit dat het één onverbrekelijk samenhing met het ander.

5.18  Een belangrijk onderdeel van de na 11 juli 1995 resterende taak van Dutchbat vormde de hulp aan en de evacuatie van de vluchtelingen. Tijdens deze overgangsperiode had naast de VN ook de Nederlandse regering in Den Haag zeggenschap over Dutchbat, omdat het ging over het voorbereiden van de algehele terugtrekking van Dutchbat uit Bosnië-Herzegovina. Daarbij vervulde Nicolai een dubbelrol doordat hij zowel namens de VN als namens de Nederlandse regering optrad. Dat Nederland zeggenschap over Dutchbat had was niet alleen een theoretisch gegeven, die zeggenschap werd ook in de praktijk uitgeoefend: de regering in Den Haag, vertegenwoordigd door twee van haar hoogste militairen, Van den Breemen en Van Baal, namen samen met Janvier het besluit tot evacuatie van Dutchbat en van de vluchtelingen, minister Voorhoeve gaf opdracht dat Dutchbat niet mocht meewerken aan een aparte behandeling van de mannen en zei tegen Karremans dat hij moest redden wat er te redden viel. De Nederlandse regering gaf via Nicolai in zijn dubbelrol ook instructies aan Karremans over de evacuatie (zie 5.16 hiervoor). Naar het oordeel van het hof ging het in al deze gevallen om instructies en niet slechts om het doorgeven van wensen of het uitspreken van zorgen, hetgeen door Nicolai ook heel goed werd begrepen ("als de Nederlandse regering zoiets zegt dan voer je dat als militair uit&quot. Nicolai faxte de order van 13 juli 1995 aan het DCBC (Defensie Crisisbeheersingscentrum) te Den Haag om te vernemen of de Nederlandse overheid hiermee kon leven (zie 5.13 hiervoor). Karremans zag het ook zo dat hij nu (mede) onder bevel van de Nederlandse regering stond en handelde daarnaar (zie 5.16 hiervoor). Het lijdt voor het hof ook geen twijfel dat de Nederlandse regering nauw betrokken was bij de evacuatie en de voorbereiding daartoe en dat zij het in haar macht had gehad de verweten gedragingen te voorkomen, indien zij daarvan tijdig op de hoogte was geweest. De feiten laten geen andere conclusie toe dan dat indien de Nederlandse regering Dutchbat opdracht zou hebben gegeven om Mustafic niet van de compound te laten vertrekken respectievelijk hem mee te nemen, deze instructie zou zijn uitgevoerd. Daarbij is bovendien van belang dat, zoals hierna zal blijken, de verweten gedragingen ingingen tegen de instructie van generaal Gobillard om de vluchtelingen zoveel mogelijk te beschermen, en dat de bevoegdheid om daartegen disciplinair op te treden bij de Staat lag.

5.19  Het optreden dat Mustafic c.s. aan Dutchbat verwijten, houdt rechtstreeks verband met de beslissingen en de instructies van de Nederlandse regering. Het verwijt dat Dutchbat Mustafic van de compound heeft gestuurd, heeft te maken met de manier waarop de evacuatie van de vluchtelingen werd uitgevoerd. Het verwijt dat Dutchbat heeft nagelaten in te grijpen bij de scheiding van Mustafic met zijn echtgenote en kinderen houdt verband met de wijze waarop de evacuatie en de instructie van minister Voorhoeve over het voorkomen van een aparte behandeling van de mannen werden uitgevoerd. Dit laatste geldt tevens voor het verwijt dat Dutchbat niet direct melding heeft gemaakt van de scheiding tussen mannen en vrouwen en de andere mensenrechtenschendingen die het heeft waargenomen.

5.20  Het hof concludeert dan ook dat de Staat 'effective control' bezat over het optreden dat Mustafic c.s. aan Dutchbat verwijten en dat dit optreden aan de Staat kan worden toegerekend. De grieven 3-9 en 11-13 zijn in zoverre terecht aangevoerd.     

By Otto Spijkers

In 1986, the International Court of Justice issued its judgment on the merits in a dispute between Nicaragua and the United States of America. It was one of the most notorious and influential judgments the Court has ever issued. Twenty-five years later, on a very sunny and hot day in The Hague, members of the legal teams of both Nicaragua and the United States faced each other once again in the Peace Palace, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of this landmark decision, and to assess its lasting impact on international law.

The conference was co-sponsored by the Grotius Centre of the Leiden Law School, the Centre on International Courts and Tribunals at University College London, the Netherlands Society of International Law, and the Law Firm of Foley Hoag LLP.

Professor Nico Schrijver, Chair of Public International Law at Leiden University, welcomed all participants. He then introduced the first panel, whose task was to discuss the impact of the Nicaragua Case on general international law. The focus of this panel was on jurisdictional issues, as well as questions of state responsibility, especially attribution and circumstances precluding wrongfulness. Professor James Crawford (University of Cambridge) criticized the Court’s decision of 1984 in which it declared it had jurisdiction to hear the case. Judge Bruno Simma of the International Court of Justice then spoke about the way the Court applied the concept of attribution in its judgment on the merits, and how its interpretation of the concept had had a lasting impact, especially on the work of the International Law Commission. He compared the ICJ’s ‘effective control’ approach with the ‘overall control’ approach of the ICTY in the Tadic case, criticizing the latter (see also this article by Cassese). At the end of his talk, Simma hinted that there might be a need to reconsider the ICJ’s approach in certain special circumstances, such as the situation in Darfur, Sudan. Prof. Pierre-Marie Dupuy (Graduate Institute of International Development Studies, Geneva) devoted his reflections to self-defense as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. And finally, Prof. Phillipe Sands (University College London) spoke about formalism and anti-formalism in the ICJ’s approach, and about the impact of the Court’s decision on life outside the community of international lawyers.

The second panel addressed issues relating to the use of force, intervention and matters of evidence. Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusef of the International Court of Justice compared the definition of ‘armed attack’ as used in the Nicaragua-case with the use of that term by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Professor John Norton Moore (University of Virginia School of Law) strongly criticized the Court’s judgment, and then Mr. Paul Reichler (Partner, Foley Hoag LLP) defended it. What was fascinating about these talks was that both had been involved as counsel in the case – Moore for the USA, Reichler for Nicaragua - and their talks sounded much like their pleadings might have sounded twenty-five years ago. The reflections of Marcelo Kohen (Graduate Institute of International Development Studies, Geneva) were read by Dr. Larissa van den Herik (Leiden University), because Kohen was unable to come to The Hague. The session was moderated by Prof. Brigitte Stern (University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne).

After an impressive luncheon, which was enjoyed in the foyer of the Academy Building but also in the beautiful gardens of the Peace Palace, the third panel discussed the impact of the Nicaragua Case on the Court and its role in the international legal order. This issue was discussed by Prof. Alain Pellet (University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense), Professor Alan Boyle (University of Edinburgh), Professor Lori Damrosch (Columbia Law School), and Professor Joe Verhoeven (Université Paris II). The session was moderated by Prof. Payam Akhavan (McGill University).

The final session had a different character. The traditional set-up – a table where the speakers awaited their turn to go to the rostrum and deliver their speech – was replaced by two comfortable leather couches, giving the impression that we were witnessing an Oprah Winfrey episode. On the couch sat Ambassador Carlos Argüello Gómez, currently Ambassador from the Republic of Nicaragua to the Netherlands but Agent of Nicaragua before the ICJ in the 1980’s; Professor Alain Pellet and Mr. Paul Reichler, both counsel for Nicaragua; Professor John Norton Moore, who was counsel for the U.S.; and Prof. Michael Glennon (Fletcher School, Tufts University) who was then called by Nicaragua to serve as witness on human rights issues. All these gentlemen were interviewed by Professor Philippe Sands. He asked them to reflect on their personal experiences as participants in the case.

Many anecdotes were shared with the audience. For example, when asked how he became involved as witness, Glennon described how he was washing his dog one morning when he received a phone call. Reichler asked him if he wanted to be witness before the World Court, and Glennon said: ‘yes, sure.’

The main theme of the final debate was the discovery of the facts, the ICJ’s efforts to figure out what really happened. Moore criticized the Court for not engaging in serious fact-finding, and suggested that the Court was perhaps fooled by one of the parties. To stress the importance of facts and its correct interpretation, he told the following anecdote: a woman with a rabbit lived next-door to a man with a big dog. One day, the dog came home with a dead rabbit between its jaws. The man suspected that his dog killed the rabbit, but he did not want to confess it to his neighbor. So he cleaned the rabbit, and put it back in the neighbor’s yard. When the neighbor came home, the man heard a loud scream. He went to her and asked what the matter was. The woman said: ‘my rabbit had died a few days ago and I buried it, but now it is back in my yard!’ In response, the many representatives of Nicaragua on the couch pointed out that the US had refused to come to the Court to present its side of the story, and that this made it difficult for the Court to uncover the truth.

Interestingly, the debate soon started to sound, once again, like oral pleadings, with the US side underrepresented in the discussion, since Moore was the sole defender of the US approach on the leather couches. The audience went home believing the case was never decided and that the two parties had continued to discuss the true nature of the US involvement in the affairs of its South-American neighbors, and would never stop doing so….

A shorter version of this post was published on the website of the Peace Palace Library.

By Tobias Thienel

Okay, so technically, the case was not about slavery in the strict sense, but the facts certainly amounted to human trafficking and forced labour. But quite regardless of the epithet, the facts of OOO v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, a recent case in the High Court in London, are chilling.

 

This case under the Human Rights Act was largely about questions of fact, but these are remarkable enough. The story the judgment tells is of a number of young girls who were tricked into coming to Britain from Nigeria on the promise of being given a better education, but who were, it appears, ruthlessly exploited. Once they had arrived in Britain, they were taken to British family homes, where they were made to work long hours for no pay, and where they were often physically abused.

 

Against that background, the case was about whether the police had done enough to investigate the complaints of the victims and prosecute those responsible. The judge - Wyn Williams J - found that they had not discharged their obligations of investigation under Article 4 of the ECHR. In that, the case is a lot like Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia and Siliadin v France (which the judge duly applied).

 

On the law, the judge rightly but not very remarkably held that the limits applicable to the obligations of investigation under Article 4 were much the same as under Article 2. What is remarkable is that these things appear to have happened more or less in the centre of London. Moreover, what is potentially more worrying is that either the police dragged their feet despite the serious crimes that had been brought to their attention, or the victims hesitated to seek help and push for prosecutions.

 

Neither state of affairs would be at all satisfactory, given that conduct of the kind alleged in this case ought to be a thing of the past. The authorities should surely bequite proactive when such allegations are made, and circumstances should be such that victims will not be afraid to seek help (which is a matter not least of immigration law). This should be so everywhere, but politically speaking, action against human trafficking and 'modern slavery' ought to have particular traction in a continent and a country that pride themselves on having acted against 'old slavery' centuries ago (even if that came some considerable time after starting the slave trade in the first place).

By Tobias Thienel

Today, the European Court of Human Rights - by a Chamber - delivered judgment in the case of Khodorkovskiy v Russia. The applicant is a famous man, and his case in the Russian courts is probably best described as infamous. The European Court has now stepped in to some extent, but has not really thrown the kitchen sink at the Russian authorities.

 

The Court found, in particular, the the conditions of Mr Khodorkovskiy's detention (before and during his first trial) had been in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, but only for a comparatively short time. The Court also found that the applicant's initial arrest had not genuinely been 'for non-compliance with a court order' (Article 5(1)(b) ECHR), as the authorities had claimed, but had actually been intended to facilitate his prosecution. This may be regarded, if only by comparison, as a more or less technical error, inasmuch as the authorities could presumably have arrested the applicant as part of the criminal proceedings (Article 5(1)(c) ECHR).

 

More worryingly, the authorities had also confiscated notes taken by Mr Khodorkovskiy's defence lawyer, on no apparent legal basis and in complete disregard of legal privilege. To make matters worse, a court had then relied on that note in extending Mr Khodorkovskiy's detention. This amounted to a violation of Article 5(3) ECHR, which the Court has now duly found. Also, two orders prolonging pre-trial detention were held to have been without proper justification, for a number of worrysome reasons. Moreover, the Court found several violations of Article 5(4), which, taken together, amount to a picture of very serious unfairness.

 

On a more politically sensitive charge, the European Court did not find a violation. The applicant had submitted, plainly not without justification, that his prosecution and his overall treatment had been politically motivated, and hence had been based on improper motives within the meaning of Article 18 ECHR. He had also referred to the well-known charge that his prosecution had in fact been ordered by Vladimir Putin himself. On this point, the 'money quote' from the judgment is as follows:

 

'The Court admits that the applicant’s case may raise a certain suspicion as to the real intent of the authorities, and that this state of suspicion might be sufficient for the domestic courts to refuse extradition, deny legal assistance, issue injunctions against the Russian Government, make pecuniary awards, etc. However, it is not sufficient for this Court to conclude that the whole legal machinery of the respondent State in the present case was ab initio misused, that from the beginning to the end the authorities were acting with bad faith and in blatant disregard of the Convention. This is a very serious claim which requires an incontrovertible and direct proof. Such proof, in contrast to the Gusinskiy case, cited above, is absent from the case under examination.'

 

In so holding, the Court did not give the Kremlin the ultimate rap across the knuckles in this case. Even so, the rebuke is obvious (although the bit about refusals of extradition etc. is a reference to certain domestic cases in which such decisions have been taken on account of Mr Khodorkovskiy's case).

 

The Court has shown itself to be careful not to push the boat out too much. It found a number of very serious violations, but did not allow its obvious concern to colour its judgment on other points. One wonders, however, how the Court will deal with the second Khodorkovskiy trial when that comes before it. It certainly appears eminently arguable that this involved a violation of Article 18, given that there seems to be much less to the recent charges than to those addressed in today's judgment.

This year's Venice Academy of Human Rights will take place in less than two months. The programme will focus on legal, political and philosophical aspects of globalisation and global governance with lectures by famous professors from all over the world including Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, David Held, Yasuaki Onuma, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Mary Robinson (Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights).

 

A few reasons why this programme is unique and particularly appealing:

 

• It focuses on a complex and yet practical topic,
• Its lectures will be delivered by eminent professors;
• It is an interdisciplinary programme;
• It is open to only 50 participants (academics, experienced practitioners, Ph.D. researchers);
• It offers a space where participants can present their work in progress (book chapters, articles, projects, etc.);
• It allows a unique environment for exchange of ideas and perspectives for research and debate;
• It is organised by EIUC which is the leading EU human rights higher education institution associating 41 European Universities;
• It is organised in the fascinating location of the Monastery of San Nicolò in Venice Lido.

 

Find out more on the application procedures at http://www.eiuc.org/veniceacademy/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=44. For more information visit www.eiuc.org/veniceacademy or write an email to veniceacademy@eiuc.org.

Lecture by Prof. Nico Schrijver

Organized by the Peace Palace Library

• Date: Wednesday 22 June, 2011
• Time: 17.30-19.30 (lecture starts at 18.00)
• Location: Peace Palace Library, Historic Reading Room
• Free entrance

About Prof. Nico Schrijver

Professor Nico Schrijver is Chair of Public International Law at Leiden University, and Academic Director at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University/Campus The Hague. He is also President of the Netherlands Society of International Law, and Member of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. He appeared before the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and as legal counsel in law of the sea cases before special ad hoc tribunals, and as expert in proceedings before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and before the Inter-American Court for Human Rights. He has working experience in the UN system, including as legal officer for the Office of the Legal Counsel, United Nations. He is Chairperson of the Committee on the International Law of Sustainable Development of the International Law Association (previously General Rapporteur) and Co-Chair (with Dr. Kamal Hossain) of the ILA Study Group on UN Reform. He was also a student and research assistant of Prof. Röling.

About Prof. Bert Röling

Bert Röling (1906-1985) studied law at the University of Nijmegen. In 1933, he defended his dissertation on the legislation regarding the so-called professional and habitual criminals (‘De wetgeving tegen de zoogenaamde beroeps- en gewoontemisdadigers’), cum laude, at Utrecht University. In 1934, Röling founded the Institute of Criminology, often called the cradle of the postwar 'Utrecht School'. Since 1936, Röling gained practical experience in criminal law as deputy judge in the District Court of Utrecht. A conflict with the Germans led to his transfer, in 1941, to Middelburg. Four years later he returned to Utrecht, and became judge at the Court of Utrecht. In 1946, he also became professor of Dutch-Indian criminal law and criminal procedure in Utrecht. But as soon as he was appointed, he was asked to serve as judge on the bench of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. From 1946 to 1948 Röling lived and worked in Tokyo and played a prominent role in the work of the tribunal. During his stay in Tokyo, Röling was appointed professor of criminal law and criminal procedure at the University of Groningen. After his return to the Netherlands he was also, from 1949 to 1951, judge at the Special Court of Appeals. Röling’s research interest and teaching at Groningen turned increasingly towards international law. In 1953, he became a member of the Advisory Committee for International Law Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1949 to 1957 he was a member of the Dutch delegation to the United Nations, where he got involved in the work of the Special Commission on the Definition of Aggression.

Registration

If you wish to attend the lecture, we kindly ask you to register in advance. To enter the premises of the Peace Palace, you are required to bring a valid ID (passport, driving license), and show this to the security at the gate of the Palace. They will show you the way to the Library. For registration and for more information, please contact Mr. Otto Spijkers of the Peace Palace Library at o.spijkers@ppl.nl.

About the Peace Palace Library Lecture Series

The Peace Palace Library Lecture Series is a lecture series on issues of general international law. Each year, approximately four lectures will be organized. All lectures are held in the Peace Palace Library. The evening starts with a small reception in the library’s new reading room. The lecture itself takes place in the historical reading room. There will be plenty of time for questions afterwards. The Peace Palace Library Lecture Series are open to everyone. They are especially interesting for researchers and students, as well as diplomats, international civil servants, journalists and other professionals working in the field of public international law.

You can now find the brand new issue of the Goettingen Journal of International Law on the Journal's homepage www.gojil.eu. It contains the papers presented at a conference held in October 2011 about the topic "Resources of Conflict - Conflicts over Resources". 18 Articles are included, which show the diversity of the topic. Enjoy!

By Dov Jacobs

Cross-posted on Spreading the Jam

I won't retrace and repeat the numerous online discussions on the general question of the legality of Bin Laden's killing. You can find some thoughts on various blogs, such as EJIL Talk!, over at Lawfare,  Opinio Juris and Justice in Conflict.

 

One issue which has not been put forward in what I've read is whether UN Security Council Resolutions could be a basis for the legality of the killing. Indeed, discussing the issue with a colleague this afternoon, we wondered whether some UNSC Res, adopted under Chapter VII could be used to justify the killing. It might seem a little far fetched, because, although Res. 1368 implicitly approved the use of force as part of the right to self-defense after the 9/11 attacks, all Resolutions I've seen in relation to Bin Laden or Al Qaeda take measures to freeze assets and call for combating terrorism, but don't explicitly allow the killing of an individual. But it is true that these Resolutions do clearly recognize the organisation and its leader as threats to peace and security and could be loosely interpreted as allowing to take these measures to stop this threat. But all in all, I didn't believe that this argument was really valid and that the SC had ever had the intention to authorize such actions...

 

...And then tonight, I saw this astonishing statement from the President of the Security Council, made on behalf of the Council. Here are some notable excerpts from the statement:

 

“In this regard, the Security Council welcomes the news on 1 May 2011 that Osama bin Laden will never again be able to perpetrate such acts of terrorism, and reaffirms that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or group.

...

“The Security Council further reaffirms its call on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of terrorist attacks and its determination that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable."

...

“The Security Council reaffirms that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law."

 

So, reading these paragraphs together in plain English, and if I'm not mistaken, 1) the Security Council approves the death of Bin Laden 2) considers that his death fits the definition of "bringing someone to justice" and "holding him accountable" and 3) considers that his death complies with international law.

 

Let's put aside the questionable fact that the SC would explicitly approve the death of an individual, even Ben Laden, and the question of the conformity with International Law, which is nonetheless interesting coming from the main executive organ of the United Nations. What strikes me is proposal number 2. How can a body, which has repeatedly called for the promotion of international criminal justice, and the values of the rule of law and due process that underly it, seriously make such a statement? If that is the definition of accountability, surely we can free some office space in The Hague and just close down the ICC, the ICTY, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. All we need is a naked wall, a blindfold and a firing squad. While we're at it, we might as well abolish our national criminal law systems. To be clear, I'm not saying that Ben Laden should not have been killed. I'm well aware of the realities of politics. I'm just denouncing the hypocrisy of defending values and then approving actions that run counter to them in the same breath. If you believe in the rule of law and due process, then you cannot approve the killing of Ben Laden, however politically or logistically justified it may be. 

The first Peace Palace Library Lecture will take place 23 may 2011, inside the historic reading room of the Peace Palace. Everybody is welcome to attend. Simon Minks, Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal in The Hague, and Roel van Rossum, Coordinating Vice-President at the District Court The Hague, will discuss the van Anraat Case, and the challenges Dutch courts face when dealing with complex issues of international criminal law. The Peace Palace Library Lecture Series consists of approximately four lectures a year about issues of international public law. Each lecture will start with a small reception in the library’s new reading room, followed by the lecture in the historical reading room. The Lecture Series are open to everyone and are especially interesting for researchers and students, as well as diplomats, international civil servants, journalists and other professionals working in the field of international public law. See the website of the Hague Justice Portal for more detailed information. We hope to see you on the 23^rd of May!

Link: http://peacepalacelibrary-weekly.blogspot.com/2011/04/is-right-to-self-determination-of.html

By Otto Spijkers

Is the right to self-determination of peoples applicable to the present revolution - or civil war - in Libya? Can one claim that a State with a dictatorial regime is violating the right to self-determination of its own population?

The most authoritative definition of the right to self-determination does not answer any of these questions. It simply states the following:

 

1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

 

In his Self-determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal, Cassese pointed out that the word ‘peoples,’ as used in Article 1 of the human rights covenants (cited above), also applied to ‘entire populations living in independent and sovereign States.’ Although the right to self-determination of an entire population of a State is perhaps the most interesting application of the right to self-determination from a philosophical point of view, it initially did not get much attention, since the political urgency was lacking. Whenever the meaning of the word ‘people’ was discussed, the dominant question was always whether it referred solely to colonial peoples, or whether it applied also to minority groups within a State. Other applications, such as the application to the entire population of a State, were not discussed extensively.

An exception to this general rule is the Friendly Relations Declaration, adopted in 1970. In that Declaration, there is one notorious paragraph about the right to self-determination of the entire population of a State. This stated, at the end of an entire paragraph on the self-determination of peoples, that

 

nothing in the foregoing paragraphs [should] be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.

This clause has been reiterated in some of the most important declarations, in particular the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), and the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (1995). In both these two documents, the phrase ‘without distinction as to race, creed or color’ was replaced by ‘without distinction of any kind,’ to emphasize that the list of prohibited distinctions in the Friendly Relations Declaration was not exhaustive.

Although it reads like a savings clause, the clause just quoted is in reality much more than that. It describes what is the essence of the right to self-determination as applied to the entire population of a State. In the view of Rosenstock, who played a principal part in the drafting of the clause, ‘a close examination of its text [would] reward the reader with an affirmation of the applicability of the principle [of self-determination] to peoples within existing states and the necessity for governments to represent the governed.’

The clause suggests that respect for the right to self-determination of the entire population of a State requires that the entire population is represented somehow by its own State’s government. Many scholars have later defined this as the essence of the right. According to Higgins, the right should be interpreted as requiring that ‘a free choice be afforded to the peoples, on a continuing basis, as to their system of government, in order that they [could] determine their economic, social, and cultural development.’ It was a right of the entire population to control its own destiny.

Such an interpretation of the principle of self-determination would be consistent with that of the drafters of the UN Charter. It was already agreed in 1945 that 'an essential element of the principle in question [was] a free and genuine expression of the will of the people, which avoid[ed] cases of the alleged expression of the popular will, such as those used for their own ends by Germany and Italy in later years.' This remark strongly suggested that a dictatorial government, like the German and Italian government during the Second World War and possibly the Libyan government of today, would constitute a violation of the right to self-determination of the oppressed people. It basically called for a democracy, or at least some form of ‘representative government’ wherein ‘all the elements of the population of the territory [were] represented in the appropriate – representative – institutions.’

The 2011 International Law Association (ILA) Asia-Pacific Regional Conference will take place in Taipei, Taiwan from May 29 to June 1, 2011.

The conference theme is “Contemporary International Law Issues in the Asia Pacific: Opportunities and Challenges.”

The registration deadline is May 10, 2011.

The keynote speakers are:

• Judge Helmut Tuerk (Vice President, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, ITLOS) and
• Professor David Caron (President, American Society of International Law).

Other speakers include:

• President Ying-jeou Ma (President, Republic of China),
• Lord Mance (Justice, Supreme Court of the United Kingdom),
• Professor Nicolaas Schrijver (President, International Law Association),
• Judges Albert Hoffmann, Jin-Hyun Paik and Shunji Yanai of the ITLOS,
• scholars and government legal advisors from various ILA branches.

The ILA Research Committee on Recognition and Non-Recognition will also convene at the conference.

Click here for the tentative conference program.

Questions can be directed to Professor Pasha Hsieh by email: ila@nccu.edu.tw.