Netherlands Institute for Human Rights

Since a few days, the Netherlands has a brand new College voor de Rechten van de Mens (National Institute for Human Rights). Why did we establish it? The Netherlands believes itself to be a country heavily committed to human rights, both nationally and internationally. When it “campaigned” for a seat in the UN Human Rights Council after the Council’s establishment in 2006, the Netherlands already pledged to establish a national human rights institute. It took some time, but now we have kept our word.

But keeping our promise is not the reason why the Institute was established, of course. The core mission of the Institute is to promote compliance with human rights within the territory of the Netherlands. The Institute will do so through a combination of advice, research and information. It will often remind the government of its responsibilities, because it is the government which is primarily responsible for the realization of human rights for all in the Netherlands. The Institute does not deal with individual human rights complaints. However, it does act as watchdog of the Dutch equal treatment legislation; in individual cases brought before it, it will decide whether someone has been discriminated against at work, at school as a consumer. It thus effectively takes over this task from the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission.

On 2 October 2012, Navanethem Pillay, herself the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, gave a speech on the occasion of the opening of the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights. According to Pillay, the new Institute should become “active in protecting marginalized individuals and groups by ensuring that principles of nondiscrimination and equality are incorporated into legislation, policies and practice.” Pillay also reminded everyone of the most persistent human rights problems in the Netherlands:

“Policies and programmes to combat all of forms of discrimination, racism and xenophobia, including those based on religion; efforts to advance the rights of immigrants and asylum seekers in the country, including in the area of justice and detention; and measures to eliminate violence against women and domestic violence.”

She was referring here to the debate between freedom of expression and respect for religious practices; the treatment of aliens in alien detention centres (much criticized by Amnesty International).

Screening of “Ai Wei Wei: Never Sorry” plus debate afterwards

Movies that Matter on Tour

On Sunday 21 October 2012, at Filmhuis The Hague, starting at 14.00 hrs, the documentary Ai Weiwei: Never Sorry will be shown, followed by a debate.

A personal portrait of Chinese dissident Ai Weiwei, who gained international acclaim for his ambitious postmodern works of art and his political provocations. Never Sorry follows three tumultuous years of his life. The film highlights the unique mix of art and activism with which the artist continuously argues in favour of freedom of expression, independent media and more transparency, thereby putting his life in jeopardy.

To make reservations, dial: +31703656030.

After the film, we have organized a debate between the public and Petra Quaedvlieg, correspondent in Shanghai for De Pers, and Anne Sytske Keijser, who teaches Chinese literature, film and language at the University of Leiden.

 

Debate on Maritime Strategies & Piracy

 

URIOS DEBATE

in cooperation with Otto Spijkers

Maritime Strategies & Piracy

On Monday 1 October 2012 the first debate evening of this
academic year will take place in the Council Hall (Raadzaal) of Achter Sint
Pieter 200 in Utrecht. This time we will discuss issues concerning Maritime
Strategies and Piracy with two guest speakers who will attend: Niels Woudstra
(Captain of the Royal Netherlands Navy and Associate professor at the
Netherlands Defence Academy) and Michiel Hijmans (Deputy Permanent Military
Representative at NATO and EU of the Netherlands Ministry of Defense, and
former Commander of the Counter Piracy Operation Ocean Shield).  These experts in this topic will present us
their experience and debate with us about this well discussed topic. The debate
evening starts at 7.00 pm and is free to enter. You can sign up by sending an
e-mail to activities@urios.org.

 

 

Nada v Switzerland: The ECtHR Does Not Pull a Kadi (But Mandates It for Domestic Law)

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By Tobias Thienel

This morning, 11 years and one day after 9/11, the European Court of Human Rights has delivered its judgment in Nada v Switzerland. The case concerned targeted sanctions by the UN Security Council, which had (until they were revised) prevented the applicant from leaving the small Italian town of Campione d’Italia. This was because the Security Council sanctions required states to prevent the applicant from crossing their borders, and Campione d’Italia is an Italian exclave within Swiss territory. Because the applicant thus could not enter Switzerland, he could not travel to any other part of Italy, either.

 

The judgment was eagerly awaited by human rights lawyers, and by those concerned with more general international law, as well. This was largely because the case raised the thorny question of whether the UN sanctions enjoyed precedence over the ECHR under Article 103 of the UN Charter. The Court had avoided this issue in the earlier case of Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, preferring there to read down the UN resolutions and thus remove the conflict by means of a harmonising interpretation. This was convincing, but wasn’t necessarily going to help in Nada, because the obligation not to allow Mr Nada to travel internationally was much more precise than was the alleged duty to detain Mr Al-Jedda. In fact, the Court in Nada has now recognised as much (para 172).

 

The Court could have done one of several things (see Marko Milanovic’s post at EJIL:Talk):

– It could nevertheless have ‘read down’ the UN obligations even in Mr Nada’s case. This might have involved a judicial extension of the very limited exceptions allowed in the sanctions regime. But this would have been exceedingly difficult.

– It could also have ‘read down’ the ECHR. This it could have done either by denying that the case came within Swiss ‘jurisdiction’ for the purposes of Article, because the matter was determined by the UN. However, the Bosphorus case, another case on the application of UN sanctions by a state, would probably have precluded this. Or the Court could have found Articles 5 and 8 inapplicable on the facts of the case (for the purposes of Article 13, this would have required even denying an ‘arguable case’ under Article 8, which was problematic).

– If the conflict thus could have been avoided from neither the one side nor the other, the Court could have gone along with the Government and the Swiss Federal Court in holding that UN law took precedence over the ECHR. This was unlikely as a matter of judicial policy.

– Instead, the Court could have been minded to follow the ECJ case of Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission. There, the ECJ had declined to give precedence to UN law over the law of the EC/EU (which the Court of First Instance before it had done). The ECJ recast the relationship between EC/EU law and international law on a strict dualist model, thus subordinating the UN Charter to the law of the European Treaties, including fundamental rights law. The ECtHR was unlikely to do this, because the European Convention can by no stretch of the imagination be assimilated to a domestic system, separated from other international law by a dualists’ wall.

– The Court could also have followed the lead of the German Solange I case. This had held (until overtaken by Solange II) that for as long as (the German word ‘solange’ means ‘as long as’) the then EEC did not have a satisfactory body of human rights law, the German Federal Constitutional Court would exercise its competence to review EEC acts under the human rights provisions of the German Basic Law. (Solange II then reversed this position, holding that the German court would not exercise its competence for as long as the EEC retained its body of fundamental rights – which the ECJ had in the meantime created.)

 

In the event, the European Court did not take any of these positions (except, in part, the first). It is noteworthy, however, that Judge Malinverni (still sitting for Switzerland in this case, but no longer on the Court) advocated a Solange I solution in his Concurring Opinion.

Continue reading

CEDAW 52nd Session Country Reports: Mexico and Bahamas

By Mel O’Brien

The final two states to have their country reports addressed in the 52nd CEDAW session were Mexico and Bahamas.
This was the first appearance of the Bahamas before the Committee, and the Committee had to address all first five reports of the country as there had been such a delay for submitting them (the Bahamas ratified CEDAW in 1993). The delegation promised to be timelier with subsequent reports.

As was a running theme with other states, with regards to women in politics and leadership, there seemed to be both a lack of understanding of what temporary special measures are and an unwillingness to apply them. Like previous states in the session, the Bahamas declared there is no need for special measures, a decision that was even declared by the Bahamas Court of Appeal. The Bahamas argued that there are ‘no barriers of advancement of women’ in the country, and that the small percentage of women elected to parliament in May 2012 does not demonstrate the fact that 16.5% of candidates were women. However, this is a very low percentage compared to the fact that over 18,000 more women than men are registered to vote. This demonstrates a real interest in politics by Bahamian women, and a need for programs that encourage women to participate in politics. Continue reading

Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights: The Receptor Approach

By Byung Sook Pattinaja-de Vries and Otto Spijkers 

In today’s debate it is often suggested that there is a fundamental difference of opinion between two opposing approaches to the domestic implementation of international human rights:

 

  1. Those adhering to the more realistic approach to human rights, those who believe that human rights should be promoted and respected from bottom up
  2. Those adhering to the more legalistic or idealistic approach, those who believe that human rights should be imposed and enforced from top down.

 

The two approaches are less far apart from each other than might appear. International law always tries simultaneously to give a description of the ideal situation (a kind of human rights utopia), and to propose feasible and step-by-step methods to bring reality closer to the ideal. The law must therefore be simultaneously idealistic and realistic.

The receptor approach is currently very popular among politicians because of its realistic character. It emphasizes the finding of a stepwise implementation method for human rights, and is thus only half of the solution: what is missing is the promotion of the ideal of universal validity human rights.

When it comes to the ideal of human rights, there are many questions to which everyone will give the same answer, without knowing exactly what both question and answer are referring to exactly. One such question is: Are human rights universal? The answer is: Yes. But what does the question entail ? And what does the answer mean?

Human rights have universal validity. They serve a higher purpose, i.e. the protection of human dignity. It began with the promulgation of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights by the United Nations. This declaration proclaimed that everyone is born free and is – and remains – equal in dignity and rights. To ensure the universal acceptance of the value of human dignity and the human rights derived there from, the United Nations has deliberately omitted a detailed definition of this value of human dignity. The UN has preferred to use a more intuitive approach
to the value of human dignity. Individuals have rights simply by virtue of being human.

The same intuitive approach is used to derive human rights from the value of human dignity. Because we are all human beings, human rights apply to everyone, without distinction of any kind, such as race, gender, political or other opinion, or any other circumstance. This ideal is also underlined by the many international human rights treaties.

The reality, however, often gives a different picture and the question is how the reality can be brought closer to
the ideal.

About the ideal itself there exist relatively few differences of opinion, especially since the ideal is always described in fairly abstract terms. Once the ideals have to be put in practice, it often becomes evident that human rights issues almost always deal with difficult and often insoluble moral dilemmas. In the Netherlands we
had the debate on freedom of expression versus religious freedom, for example.

Disagreements over the proper way to implement international human rights in domestic practice take place both within and between States. Similar human rights dilemmas can be resolved differently by different States. As long as the universality of human rights is taken into account, it is not problematic that differences exist between  States when it comes to the implementation of human rights.

In Europe there is the margin of appreciation doctrine, which gives the European States certain flexibility in the application of the European Convention on Human Rights. This means that States have some room for interpretation on the basis of their own particular circumstances and situation. Political, economic, social and cultural elements play a role. The influence of different cultures does not necessarily affect the validity of universal human rights. On the contrary, cultural diversity can enrich the human rights discourse.

That is why the receptor approach, which takes the practice as starting point and seeks to link international human rights with local traditions, is not immediately in violation of the universal approach, which begins with the proclamation of the ideal.

This idea of looking for local connections is not new. NGOs, working with local partners to improve human rights from below, have always recognized the importance of the local context.

Despite certain positive aspects the receptor approach may have, there is good reason for caution when taking this approach in human rights policy. There is the threat of a deadlock which is difficult to break. Attachment of human rights policies to local cultures must be done in a critical manner. This can lead to the conclusion that some local practices do not – and will never – meet international human rights standards and should thus be abolished. Such harsh objections
from the international (or mostly Western) community targeting cultural or social aspects of a more traditional society may have as a consequence that the State concerned will view such criticism as a form of moral imperialism. On the other hand, failure to utter this criticism affects the universality of human rights in a negative way. Criticism cannot always be avoided, even though dialogue between States is preferred. States should not lecture other States with a "wagging finger," but instead use that finger to point out that international human rights treaties with various obligations have
been ratified by almost all States.

A certain degree of confrontation also appears necessary to complement the receptor approach. What are the implications when local culture provides no possibilities to link human rights, i.e., when there are no receptors? The local context may never be used as an excuse  to not fulfill the universal human rights
standards.

Human rights are based on human dignity. On that basis, everyone always has human rights. While the receptor approach adheres to the universal validity of human rights, and only complements the existing legal system that serves to promote human rights with alternative locally-based methods, the approach is not problematic. The approach becomes problematic when the practice and the local receptors for human rights are not compatible with universal human rights. It is therefore critical to consider the pitfalls of the approach. Furthermore, the innovative character of the “receptor approach” should not be
over exaggerated. It does not revolutionize the way in which human rights are implemented in the domestic context.

Assisted Suicide, The Courts and the ECHR

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By Tobias Thienel

On 19 July 2012, the European Court of Human Rights gave judgment in the case of Koch v Germany. The case is notable for advancing the debate on a right of assisted suicide, without itself entering into the debate at all. It is also noteworthy for recognising that not only the person wishing to die, but also that person’s close relatives, have a legal interest in the matter.

 

The facts were – as so often in these cases –  tragic. The applicant’s wife had been suffering for some time from total sensorimotor quadriplegia, that is to say she was almost completely paralysed and utterly dependent on carers. She wished to commit suicide, and therefore contacted the relevant authorities for permission to obtain some pentobarbital of sodium (otherwise used for lethal injections in the United States). Her application was refused. She eventually committed suicide in Switzerland, where the law was more amenable to her wishes.

 

Her husband attempted to continue the legal proceedings begun by his wife (and himself). His case was ruled inadmissible at all levels, including by the Federal Constitutional Court (Case No. 1 BvR 1832/07). (Only the court at first instance added, obiter, that the husband would also have failed on the merits, the withholding of the poison having been lawful.) The courts found that the surviving husband could not rely on any rights formerly enjoyed by his late wife. In particular, his rights under the constitutional protection of marriage (Article 6(1) of the Basic Law) did not bestow standing on him to raise the issue whether his wife should have been given the right to obtain the medication to end her life.

 

The European Court of Human Rights disagreed, at least in the result. It joined the analysis of the German courts in holding that the applicant could not rely on his late wife’s rights under the ECHR as such. However, it found the applicant’s own rights under Article 8 ECHR to be engaged. He had been married to his wife for 25 years and had felt for her during her quest to end her life. Accordingly, on account of ‘the exceptionally close relationship between the
applicant and his late wife and his immediate involvement in the
realisation of her wish to end her life
‘, the Court held that the applicant himself had been directly affected by the decision regarding his wife’s access to lethal drugs (para 50).

Continue reading

Esther Kiobel, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, and the right to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources

The case between Esther Kiobel and the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company was set for re-argument in the United States Supreme Court on Monday, October 1, 2012. If I understood it correctly, one of the two questions posed to the Court is the following:

Are foreign corporations immune from tort liability in the US courts for violations of international law committed abroad?

The US has little to do with the case, and thus it could be argued that the case should really be decided in Nigeria, where the alleged violations took place. In any case, the case will likely be about jurisdictional issues, especially universal jurisdiction. Plenty of bloggers will comment on this aspect of the case.

But what if the case actually reaches the merits? What type of disputes could then make their way to the US courts? The Oil Company’s liability will be based on particular acts, not the general scheme of things. Nonetheless, it might be interesting – even though the case will probably not deal with this explicitly – to look at fundamental underlying issues.

The case has a lot to do with the people’s right to exploit their natural resources for their own benefit. The question is whether it is up to a State – read: government – to decide what is to the benefit of the people, or whether the people, including minority peoples, have a right to be involved in such decision-making. The question is relevant because the government of Nigeria does appear to benefit from its contract with the Oil Company, but minority peoples clearly do not.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has often emphasized the right of peoples to exploit their own resources according to their own policies. In the beginning, these debates took place in the context of decolonization. In the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, for example, the Assembly

affirm[ed] that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law.[1]

This right was formulated in a general sense, but the fact that it was included in the Decolonization Declaration made it especially – and perhaps even exclusively – applicable to colonial peoples. In 1967, the Assembly ‘reaffirm[ed] the inalienable right of the peoples of the colonial territories to self-determination and independence and to the natural resources of their territories, as well as their right to dispose of these resources in their best interests.’[2] It further ‘deplore[d] the policies of the colonial Powers which permit[ted] the exploitation of the natural resources of the Territories under their administration contrary to the interests of the indigenous population.’[3] It thus called upon all ‘colonial Powers’ to prohibit in particular the following practices:

The exploitation of human and natural resources contrary to the interests of the indigenous inhabitants;

The obstruction of the access of the indigenous inhabitants to their natural resources;

The promotion and tolerance of injustice and discrimination in the remuneration of labor and in the establishment of working conditions.[4]

It further ‘request[ed] the colonial Powers to stop immediately the practice of alienation of lands from the indigenous inhabitants and to take immediate action to return to them all such alienated lands.’[5] In 1980, all States were encouraged to ‘ensure that the permanent sovereignty of the countries and Territories under colonial, racist and alien domination over their natural resources shall be fully respected and safeguarded.’[6] In 1981, the Assembly stressed that ‘by their depletive exploitation of natural resources, the continued accumulation and repatriation of huge profits and the use of those profits for the enrichment of foreign settlers and the entrenchment of colonial domination over the Territories, the activities of foreign economic, financial and other interests operating at present in the colonial Territories […] constitute[d] a major obstacle to political independence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources of those Territories by the indigenous inhabitants.’[7] A few years later, the Assembly became ‘increasingly aware of the importance of economic, social and cultural development and self-reliance of colonial countries and peoples for the attainment and consolidation of genuine independence.’[8]

As time passed, the Assembly, instead of simply condemning exploitation of natural resources by foreign subjects, also began to stress the usefulness of international assistance and cooperation. For example, in 1996, the Assembly ‘affirm[ed] the value of foreign economic investment undertaken in collaboration with the people of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and in accordance with their wishes in order to make a valid contribution to the socio-economic development of the Territories.’[9] The difference between exploitation and the latter type of economic foreign investment is obvious. Clearly, exploitation was prohibited, but voluntary and mutually beneficial investment was welcomed.

The Assembly refers frequently to the indigenous population. But the question remains whether we are talking about a right belonging to peoples, or a right belonging to newly independent States. In the Human Rights Covenants, there is a relevant provision which proclaims that:

All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.[10]

If the right mentioned above is truly a peoples’ right, then it ‘presumably limits the power of the national government freely to dispose of the natural resources […] without the consent (or against the wishes or contrary to the interests) of the “people”.’[11] If a government does not exploit the resources for the benefit of its own people, what should be done? Should the government be removed from power and be replaced by a government that does distribute the resources evenly over the population? If we pursue this reasoning to its very end, then, as Dam-de Jong pointed out, ‘the State, represented by its government, may only exercise the right to permanent sovereignty on behalf of its population [and must] be regarded as a trustee and not as holder of the right.’[12] And, presumably, trustees can be fired if they fail to do a good job. But instead of targeting the governments, in cases such as the Kiobel case, the multinational corporations are targeted.

In any case, it is not so clear whether the provision in the human rights covenant really intended to grant a right to peoples as opposed to States. Only a few years after the drafting of the human rights covenant provision was finished, in 1962, the Assembly adopted its resolution on permanent sovereignty over natural resources.[13] In that resolution, the Assembly proclaimed that

the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned.[14]

The resolution stated this as a general principle, and did not explain what the consequences would be in case a local Government exploited the State’s natural resources for the benefit of a small group of individuals, as opposed to all the State’s inhabitants. In fact, the resolution’s prime aim was to emphasize the right of States over their own natural resources, and not to pose conditions on such
exclusive ownership.

[1] Preamble, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

[2] Para. 2 of the resolution with perhaps the longest name in the Assembly’s history: Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa, General Assembly resolution 2288 (XXII), adopted 7 December 1967.

[3] Idem, para. 5.

[4] Idem, para. 7.

[5] Idem, para. 10.

[6] Para. 7, Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly resolution 35/118, adopted 11 December 1980.

[7] Para. 1, Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa, General Assembly resolution 36/51, adopted 24 November 1981.

[8] Preamble, Twenty-fifth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

[9] Para. 2, Activities of foreign economic and other interests which impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under colonial domination, General Assembly resolution 51/140, adopted 13 December 1996. Most of the resolution dealt with foreign exploitation.

[10] Article 1(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

[11] Crawford, ‘The rights of peoples,’ p. 64.

[12] P. 34, Dam-de Jong, ‘International Law and Resource Plunder.’

[13] Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA resolution 1803(XVII), adopted 14 December 1962.

[14] Para. 1, Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.

CEDAW 52nd Session Country Reports: New Zealand and Samoa

By Mel O’Brien

I thought I would put NZ and Samoa in the same blog post, as they are two Pacific island countries, and so it is a useful comparison. The two states are in completely different situations, however, in many ways, with regards to advancement and equality of women.

The issue of women in politics continues to be a pressing issue for the Committee, and they have pushed this topic with every state whose report(s) has(ve) been considered. There was no love lost with either NZ or Samoa, however. In the case of NZ, there was, we repeatedly heard, "no appetite" for special measures like quotas to increase the number of women in parliament. NZ does have a relatively high percentage of women in parliament, at 32%, however this is down from previous governments, and in general the trend towards women’s advancement is decreasing in NZ. As a consequence, the Committee pushed for NZ to consider implementing temporary special measures, although the NZ delegation did not take to this idea. Continue reading