By Tobias Thienel
A week ago, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decided the case of S and Marper v United Kingdom, holding that the practice of the UK in storing DNA data and tissue samples of people once suspected of a crime even after they have been cleared amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (the right to respect for private life).
The Court stressed in particular that the DNA profiles and samples in question contained a wealth of intensely personal data about the persons affected. That being so, they came within the notion of those persons’ ‘private life’, and retention of such data by the State constituted an interference with Article 8, such as to call for justification. This was the first point on which the Court disagreed not only with the Government’s submissions, but also with the views of the House of Lords, which had previously been called upon to apply the ECHR to those issues. The House had held by a majority (and the Government had submitted to the ECHR) that an interference did not arise simply from the storing of personal data (R (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2004] UKHL 39, [2004] 1 WLR 2196, para 31). That has now turned out, on earlier ECtHR authority (Amann v Switzerland, para 69), to be quite wrong.