By Richard Norman
Tony Blair has assumed the role of Mideast Envoy for the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia, and UN), and opinions on his appointment are split down predictable lines: with Arab nations, Hamas, and Iran disapproving (Blair as envoy "is like appointing the Emperor Nero to be the chief fireman of Rome," according to Rami Khouri); and, Israel, on the other hand thrilled. Everyone, however, agrees that it is an incredibly difficult job. It is especially difficult when all involved are locked in the straitjacket that is the two state solution. Blair’s appointment is a chance to look back on the fourteen years that have passed since the Oslo Accords and see just how badly the situation has deteriorated. Opportunities for peace have been squandered. Both Israelis and Palestinians have become deeply entrenched in their positions. What might have been a turning point, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in the summer of 2005, has proven to be a disaster for everyone involved. Led by a fanaticism that is detached from political reality, Hamas has now taken full control of Gaza. Fatah, tottering and corrupt, controls (for the moment at least) the West Bank. This violent, fratricidal split has made the enormous difficulties of establishing a viable Palestinian state impossible. But perhaps the current crisis contains the seed of an important opportunity. What if an energetic and realistic Envoy Blair convinced the Quartet to abandon the two state solution, and instead seek a comprehensive framework to implement a three state solution? No, not Hamastan, Fatahstan, and Israel, but something much more traditional. A return of the Gaza strip to Egypt and a return of the West Bank (minus certain Israeli settlements) to Jordan. Palestinians in these territories would then become citizens of their new respective nations. In exchange for accepting these new populations and for promising to police and integrate them, Egypt and Jordan would receive massive funding from the international community and Israel to provide new infrastructure in the former territories and modernized security forces. In a recent debate at the Council of Foreign Relations, former American envoy, Dennis Ross, spoke of how the EU at one point promised up to two billion dollars worth of development money to Gaza alone if the United States would match it (the US didn’t). If a plan appears viable then huge amounts of money can be obtained to support it. One of the reasons why the current peace process is so crippled (and why the Americans have more or less removed themselves from it) is because it continues to operate on yesterday’s assumptions. The orthodoxy lacks imagination and it lacks a sense of reality. Creating and funding a functioning state ex nihilo is much more difficult than arranging its absorption into existing polities and systems. After all, the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank are indistinguishable from their Arab neighbours only a few dozen kilometers away in Egypt and Jordan. What are the obstacles? President Bush, an extraordinarily unimaginative man, is unlikely to revise any plan he has committed himself to (even if in this case it is only a nominal commitment); like much American foreign policy this idea may have to wait until 2009. The other problem, of course, would be bringing Egypt and Jordan to the negotiating table. This would be incredibly difficult. But perhaps if enough money were promised by the international community they would begin to consider the potential upside of taking responsibility. But this too, particularly in the case of Egypt, may have to wait for new leadership. Here is the argument in plain terms from the Israeli professor Efraim Inbar:
Little can be done by outsiders to fix the Palestinian mess. Generally, foreigners are limited in their abilities to influence the domestic socio-political dynamics of Middle Eastern societies. Western political pressure and/or financial aid can hardly change entrenched ways of conducting political affairs. Foreign support to the Palestinians and the preservation of the UNWRA relief system only sustain the unsuccessful status quo, allowing for increased militarization of Palestinian society and prolonging its inclination to refrain from facing the grim reality navigated by its leaders. Nurturing the national hopes of the dysfunctional Palestinian national movement will only bring further suffering to the Palestinians and their neighbors. The only chance to alleviate the Palestinian situation is foreign rule. Indeed their best friends, realizing that the Palestinians are not politically mature for self-rule, advocate an international mandate. Yet it is not at all clear why an international mandate enforced by an international force should be any more successful than the US in Iraq. Recalling the colonial record of the UK and France in the Middle East, the conclusion is inescapable that only Arabs can rule over Arabs by Arab methods. The potential candidates for ruling over the Palestinians are Jordan and Egypt, as was done with relative success before 1967. The international community should encourage Egypt and Jordan’s increased involvement in Palestinian affairs. These states have signed peace treaties with Jerusalem and behave more responsibly than the PA leadership. The peace initiative of the Arab League might become the mechanism for a transition from a two-state formula to a more realistic regional approach.
It is long past time for creative thinking on this problem. Perhaps with new international energy devoted to the Middle East, there will be room for new solutions to be considered. -Richard
Hi all – Those still thinking about what Mr. Blair should do in his new job might take a look at the Economist blog.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/certainideasofeurope/2007/07/france_moves_too_fast_for_eus.cfm
Apparently Mr. Sarkozy has a few ideas for Mr. Blair ……..
Hi Richard – It is odd indeed that Russia is expected to play a constructive role given its link with Iran. Does the phrase “game playing” ring true here?
Hi Michael, I agree completely. A situation like this might have worse consequences then simply no agreement: ill-intentioned, dilatory parties to the negotiation can buy time to gain strength and wreak even more damage. The solution must come from the region, and I think Egypt and Jordan must become much more involved. How is it possible that Russia is a member of the Quartet and not Egypt/Jordan/other Arab states?
Nice exchange! Of course, any significant shift in policy should anticipate how the affected parties would react. But I think that the weakness of the current approach is reflected in the perception that the west can only change its policy thinking if all agree to the change in advance. This gives groups with interests that are not necessarily in line with our own a veto over our thinking. As Richard points out, we commit ourselves to a process that may be bound to fail. Thus we cling to the view that the Palestinian problem is one of protracted negotiation between Israel and a ?representative” of the Palestinian people. Perhaps we should consider also that there exist significant local incentives to insure that such negotiations persist but fail. Why? To create and nurture a power vacuum that allows those who are committed to gaining power through violence to gradually wear down their local opponents. Let’s wake up. This has happened before. I think that we should take seriously the possibility that our commitment to midwife a democratic Palestinian state will continue to strengthen those who are even more strongly committed to achieving power through violence. Taking a line from an American movie (The Untouchables), ? (we) bring a knife to a gun party”. In effect, our current policy may be, in the name of promoting democracy, to try to hand over power to groups that are not in a position to govern in the current setting. Is this wise? If we see things this way, can we say so openly (or in private) to our friends, Egypt and Jordan? As a policy matter, shouldn’t we try to persuade them to reflect more creatively to confront this problem, rather than stand on the sidelines and do nothing as violent fundamentalism grows ever more powerful?
I completely agree there are many problems with this idea. But is this idea MORE difficult than the two state solution? Is the two state solution the consensus plan because it makes the most sense or because everyone goes around saying there is no alternative to it?
Intriguing proposal, but as Doug mentioned, perhaps the most important question is what do the Paletinians think about it? I know it seems to us outsiders that almost anything is better than the status quo, but isn’t that the failure of Oslo kind of indicates that the Palestinians are not willing to “settle,” or a vocal and sizable minority has a veto on the issue.
Sometimes there’s a reason things are outside the box.
Problem #1: Egypt wants nothing to do with Gaza. Why /would/ they want a desperately poor, crowded territory full of violent people who are not Egyptian?
Problem #2: the Palestinian leadership does not want to give Gaza to Egypt. This applies to Hamas and Fatah both.
Problem #3, more generally, the Palestinian leadership is committed to Palestinian nationalism. You’re asking them to say, oh, just kidding, we’re happy to not have a state of our own as long as we get enough foreign money. This seems, at a minimum, optimistic.
Problem #4: Jordan does not want the West Bank. Recall that “original” Jordanians are about half of Jordan’s population, while Palestinians are the other half, give or take. They’ve managed to live together since 1970, but the underlying fault line still runs through Jordanian society. And the original Jordanians — who dominate the Army, police, and security services — have no interest in making themselves a minority in their own country.
Problem #4a, one proposed workaround is to have a loose Jordanian-Palestinian federation, with sovereignty in Amman but local self-rule. The problem here is that it gives Amman responsibility — they’d be drawn into conflict with Israel regularly over settlements, boundary disputes, water, etc. — without power. So that’s a non-starter too.
Other than that, sounds great.
Doug M.
Interesting! If this becomes part of the dialogue over peace in the Middle East, it is likely to reflect a larger shift in strategic thinking. The current strategic vision is that the west is engaged in a long term struggle to promote democratic values that will gradually pacify the region, and that the west must win. Pursuing the “two state solution” made strategic sense if “assistance” could induce Palestine to become a democratic ally of the west. The US effort in Iraq also makes sense if it “assists” the Iraqi transition to democracy and alliance with the west. The emergent strategic view may be that the “war against terrorism” is in fact a type of civil war within Islam that can only be “won” by “moderate” Muslims themselves fighting against “radicals”. As long as the west chooses to lead the fight against the radicals, the moderates can delay entering the fight. But sooner or later, moderate Islamic states may have to take a leadership role in fighting a war that they must win. Put more directly, the west can assist but cannot win this “war”. Abandoning the “two state solution” might make sense in order to engage Egypt and Jordon more directly in the conflict rather continue to allow them to sit on the sidelines. But will Arab states such as Egypt and Jordon be willing to risk becoming combatants? I think we may find out.