By Richard Norman
President Bush received a fair amount of flak (though no more than usual) this week when he compared the potential consequences of withdrawing from Iraq to those of leaving Vietnam, saying, "One unmistakable legacy of Vietnam is that the price of America’s withdrawal was paid by millions of innocent citizens, whose agonies would add to our vocabulary new terms like ‘boat people,’ ‘re-education camps’ and ‘killing fields’." After years of the most abysmal communication, pathetic rhetoric, and plain historical ignorance, the U.S. government is finally making a strong argument in defence of its Iraq policy.
White House aides speaking on background insist Bush, who even made a curious reference to Graham Greene’s classic novel of American misguided idealism, The Quiet American, was not trying to "relitigate the Vietnam war." "We understand that people might be surprised by his using that example, but it’s for a very specific purpose," said one White House aide, "which is what were people saying about what would happen if we left [Vietnam] and what are people saying about what will happen if we leave Iraq? The Vietnam war has been analyzed every which way and that’s not what he was trying to do, he was trying to deal with the current debate we’re in now, weighing the consequences should America walk away from its commitment in Iraq." [Time]
Democrats were quick to leap on what they called a flip-flop, as were professional commentators, with one wag suggesting Bush should have talked more about Our Man in Havana and less about The Quiet American. For years Democrats have been comparing Iraq to Vietnam, while completely ignoring the devastating consequences of the end of American involvement in Southeast Asia. Their best response to Bush’s argument is to call him a flip-flopper. I’m rubber and you’re glue… War historian, Max Boot lays out the dire consequences of American withdrawal from Iraq (with reference to Vietnam) in a recent oped in the Wall Street Journal. For those who believe that South Vietnam was hopelessly lost, that there was never any hope that it could be a successful and independent country, the questions is: Why did South Korea survive? Why is it the 11th largest economy in the world? Why do its people enjoy a quality of life far superior to the supposed economic success story of Vietnam? The answer is: the Americans didn’t give up. They made and kept a promise and they devoted the lives of their servicemen and billions of dollars to ensure success. It took decades. It was grueling, but the alternative may well have been a unified Communist Korea–80 million people suffering under the Kim dynasty. Not to mention a much more dangerous military power in the region. It’s entirely arguable that the trade and security dividends from South Korea outweigh the military costs of ensuring its independence over the years. Iraq is much more strategically important to the United States than either Vietnam and Korea, and yet the rush for the exit has been characterized by even more abandon. –Richard
Let me make an analogy that might explain my comment that there is no war of ideas. I think there is no real difference between the ideas of Islamic extremists (especially in the Al-Qaeda mode) and the Manson Family. Both are violent cults led by enigmatic gurus. Both aim to start a race/religious war that will result in the return of the messiah. I think the West should no more engage with these ideas than the police engaged with the philosophy of Charles Manson when they arrested him… The war of ideas is happening/or should be happening in Islam itself between moderates and extremists. I don’t deny extremists strongly, strongly believe in their idea–but I completely discount its legitimacy and rationality.
Hi Richard
Well there you go! The idea of President Bush “firing up” the conservatives provides an interesting image. Perhaps Mr.’s Guiliani and Romney will take note. BTW, President Bush tried offering a positive justification for the Iraqi occupation with his “let’s bring democracy to the Middle East” chit chat. This was such a disaster, however, that perhaps it has discouraged White House policy makers (and Ms Rice) from saying anything positive about Iraq at all. I do not think that the argument that fighting there will help the US avoid fighting elsewhere is persuasive or positive (sounds too much like the old domino theory). But I think the next president whoever it is, will end up staying in Iraq because there is no real strategic alternative. Perhaps the appropriate analogy is Britain in Northern Ireland.
I do disagree with your comment that there is no “war of ideas” at stake. I think that violent fundamentalists are fighting for an idea. That idea may seem stupid to us, but they believe that violence empowers Islam as they believe it should practiced. Thus, I think they welcome the violence in Iraq and elsewhere just as communists in the old days welcomed revolution. We underestimate them by thinking that they fight out of sheer nihilistic insanity. We can deny safe havens for terrorists — good idea. But we also need to fight their idea that violence is empowering to Islam. There is a military dimension to fighting this, but my point (sorry if I have made it too many times) is that it is not only military. We can win on the battlefield again and again, but lose the war if we are not careful. The war against terrorism has local political and ideological dimensions as well as military ones.
Michael, I think you’ve identified an important point. In this recent speech Bush is giving a negative reason why Americans should stay in Iraq: If we DON’T stay… To convince Americans, it’s a lot easier to give a positive reason: We’re fighting because… And as many Americans really don’t care what happened to the Vietnamese or what might happen to the Iraqis, the President–a poor communicator at the best of times–has his work cut out for him. The positive reasons have been given by McCain (and Bush at other times), “If we don’t fight them there, we’ll have to fight them here.” Is this legitimate? Or is it fear-mongering? At first, I hated this line, but recently I’ve come to think it is an appropriate response to people who think the US should withdraw now. Another example is the President mentioning 9/11 in reference to Iraq as often as possible, and why so many Americans by now believe that Saddam was instrumental in plotting those attacks. These are the best arguments the Bush admin has. In the mouth of Hillary Clinton they would be much more convincing. The problem is this president has no credibility.
You’re right that Bush’s recent comparisons of Iraq to Vietnam are unlikely to fire up ordinary Americans who have never even heard of the Khmer Rouge or a reeducation camp. Nevertheless, these historical analogies are important to anchor predictions about an Iraq post-American withdrawal. Rather than just saying to people, there will be a bloodbath–he can say, It will be just like after we left Vietnam. Plus this fires up a lot of conservatives who believe–rightly or wrongly–that Vietnam could have been won or ended better. And the reason Bush’s support has been eroding is because a lot of these conservatives have been leaving his camp…
Hi Otto, I guess the question would be: Was the fact that the UN oversaw the mission to Korea and not Vietnam the decisive factor in the former’s success and the latter’s failure? I think it provided more legitimacy, obviously, but had no influence on the fighting. I would be interested to know about the UN’s role in Korea in the late ’50s and 60s.
Another point related to your discussion with Michael on the Power of Nightmare post and important to this discussion. The idea that a military solution will never succeed against terrorist tactics. Now, I agree that diplomatic action can be very useful in conjunction with military action (and that this is something Bush has failed miserably to realize), but Bush is decidedly not fighting an idea. In both his wars against terrorism–Afghanistan and Iraq–the plan has been to prevent either country being used as a safe harbour by terrorists. The MO of the war is to deny Al Qaeda and other terrorists operating bases, cut off their finances, smoke them out and kill them. This worked in the beginning in Afghanistan (but now shows mixed results because of a lack of security there). In Iraq, this policy was not properly applied and thousands of mistakes were made. But Petraeus has the policy back on track (at least in spirit). How do you go about addressing the root causes of terrorism? Redistribute wealth? Force free elections in Egypt, for example (which will elect an Islamist govt)? This is an impossible task.
The first step is to deny safe harbours for terrorists to plot larger attacks. It would have helped enormously if this had been done properly in Iraq, but it hasn’t. Nevertheless, to leave Iraq would mean to virtually ensure it would be used by terrorists to plot larger attacks…
Hi Richard – I will agree with you on one point. The discussion about Iraq has not given sufficient dignity to the suffering of Iraqis trapped in the conflict. By the way, the same was true of Vietnam both during and after that conflict. Indeed, one can contrast the recent speech by President Bush about the horrors that will unfold if the US leaves Iraq with the stony silence of the Bush Administration about the deaths of over 500 men, women and children killed by four suicide bombers several months ago. Take a look at Tom Friedman’s comment on this
http://laf.ee/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=282&Itemid=323
If the Bush Administration really cared about Iraqis, it would have put more troops on the ground three years ago. At least it would be engaged in a PR war with Bin laden to win the “hearts and minds” of Islamic peoples to stop the passive acquiescence in suicide bombings. It did not then, and it is not now. A little honesty might help here, but I agree — let’s move on.
So where are we? In my view, the strategic mistake (as it was in Vietnam) is to see the conflict in military terms only. In fact, the surge can only work if it produces a shift in Iraqi political thinking from infighting to consensus building. Current reports suggest no shift is occurring. Let’s hope it does soon because (thanks to the strategy of the Bush Administration) the surge cannot be sustained for very long. I am skeptical that this shift will happen because I see no logical connection between US policy and local interests. Again, Tom Friedman is useful
http://laf.ee/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=283&Itemid=324
Another article by US soldiers reaches a similar conclusion
http://laf.ee/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=284&Itemid=325
And how about this article about what is going on now in Faluja during the surge
http://laf.ee/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=285&Itemid=326
So what should happen? One can’t help but be a bit angry that the strategic options are so damned limited. One strategic option (for example) might be to create a semi-permanent protectorate over the region. This is essentially what happened in Korea (which was why the UN endorsement was critical). But that would require UN support. Likely for Iraq? And would the Arabs agree to such a deal? Hmmm.
For now, it looks like the US will just have to “win” the fight on its own, as it tried to do in Vietnam. The Bush speech harps on this silly old theme – that the world would be better off if the US had just “stayed the course” and “won” in Vietnam. I lived through this period and remember the rhetoric rather well. The bravado of those who sent others to fight for them was never matched with strategic wisdom (or empathy or even honesty). Victory was always just around the corner, but no one would explain why the fighting was so fierce, and so many died. No one could understand why communism could have been so appealing to anyone except that they had been brainwashed by Uncle Ho and the Russians. Taking your point about Cambodia — in those days, most Americans had no idea that the US had any connection to what was going on in Cambodia let alone any sense of the dangers posed by the Khmer Rouge. After all, North Vietnam was the declared enemy (as Al Qaeda is now). Are you surprised then that there was no coherent strategy to oppose the Khmer Rouge? Our Cambodian allies? The Khmer who? Don’t be ridiculous. None of this was explained, debated, or understood at the time. That was why the war could not be won or sustained beyond the 13 years the US was engaged. Isn’t it rather amazing that after 13 years, the American people still had relatively little sense of what that war was about other than “communism”?
So, perhaps a test for whether there is a workable strategy to fight a war is to see if you can put it in words in a way people understand and support (i.e. are ready to die for). What is that framework in Iraq? The best I can do is “Give us more time”. “We fight for more time!” To put it more crude terms – “We will die if needed in order to allow the Iraqi Parliament to take its summer vacation!” Watch out when they come back! Well, once again, an international protectorate could give the Iraqis as much time as they need. But acting alone, the US did not consider that giving time would merit such a high priority in its occupation strategy. Now we all fear that time may working be against us and we are running out of time. A weak strategic position?
Sad to say, it is a very weak (and rather stupid) strategic position. That does not mean, however, that the US also is likely to leave Iraq any time soon. The US will likely stay and the civil war will likely drone on. Richard, your worst fears are likely to be confirmed while the US military is there. Thousands of Iraqis, and a smaller number of US and other allied soldiers are likely to die in violent incidents in a slowly unwinding process that probably will lead to some sort of partition. Does that mean we all care more about the Iraqis because the US will keep its troops there? Well, I guess we care slightly more than we cared for the Cambodians in the bad old days. At least we know they exist.
Hello Richard and Michael,
I have to agree with Michael here, about the important difference between a UN-mandated operation and unilateral action. It is true that the Korea operation was led by the United States, as has been the case for most UN operations (and this was the intention of the founding fathers of the United Nations: the big nations had a special responsibility for the maintenance of the peace). But it is important, in my view, that there was considerable support for the operation in Korea: more than 20 countries joined (according to Wikipedia, ‘Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. The Union of South Africa provided air units which fought along side the air forces of other member nations. Denmark, India, Norway, and Sweden provided medical units. Italy provided a hospital, even though it was not a UN member’). And it got a mandate from the United Nations (for some of the peculiar legal aspects related to this mandate, see our post on the Korean cemetery).
Hi Michael… Let me respond to a couple of points first. 1) Korea was a UN mission, yes, but with all American generals and 480 000 American troops (next highest number Britain at 60 000) fighting alongside several hundred thousand Korean troops trained and supplied by the US (just like in Vietnam). So I think the comparison is appropriate. 2) Just like in Iraq, the US made many mistakes in Vietnam. I agree that one of them was to misunderestimate/confuse Vietnamese nationalism with a monolithic idea of Communism. But I don’t agree that Korea was different in this respect. Nationalism and Communism were similarly confused in that war too. And while the desire to see a unified Vietnam played an important role in driving the North to continually attack the South (just like in Korea), there were millions and millions of South Vietnamese who didn’t want to live under a Communist government, and that’s why they resisted.
As for the blog posting on the speech, I don’t agree with its conclusions either. I don’t believe that failure in Iraq is inevitable, and that because it is inevitable it is right that the US should cut its losses. As I’ve said elsewhere, the consequences could potentially be far worse than what happened post-1975 in Southeast Asia, and I think as long as there is a small chance to win, the US should take it.
I completely agree that this is all a mess of the Bush admin’s making. But I’m past that. The question is what happens now. I think the US needs more time, more troops, more money, and more understanding to begin to succeed–but that leaving Iraq to its own devices–aka the alternative, which advocates of withdrawal again and again seem unable to bring themselves to say–is not smart.
Just one more point and this I think is the crux of the debate. The obsidian author quotes David Hendrickson:
“The Khmer Rouge would never have come to power in the absence of the war in Vietnam ? this dark force arose out of the circumstances of the war, was in a deep sense created by the war.”
OK–so there wouldn’t have been a Khmer Rouge if there hadn’t been a war. Just like there wouldn’t be such a terrible mess in Iraq if the US had never invaded. Fine–I agree. But that is not the question. The question is if the US had continued to support its allies with air cover, money, and training would the Khmer Rouge have had the chance to come to power? All we know is that it wasn’t until the Democratic Congress cut off funding to the American-supported regime in Cambodia that they ran out of bullets to defend themselves. Cause: America cuts off support; Effect: Allied Cambodian government falls, Khmer Rouge takes power. Now, if you think that it was better for America to cut its losses (at this point only financial losses) in 1975, you are entitled to that opinion. But the unavoidable fact is that as much as the general war may have destabilized the region and created the basic potential for the Khmer Rouge (for example) to develop in embryonic form, there is no reason to believe their rise was inevitable UNTIL the Americans called it a day and went home to watch TV.
Hi Richard — Before you respond, you might want to review this blog
http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2007/08/by-hilzoy-once-.html
about the speech President Bush made.
Wow! You (and President Bush) are really over the top here!
In Korea there was a genuine sense among Koreans that the invasion from the north was foreign and unwelcome. Thus UN assistance to repel it was welcome, and in the end Koreans fought hard (and many died) to make it a success. By the way, I am surprised that an internationalist like you would ignore that Korea was a UN action — not just a US action. In Vietnam, the US (not the UN) took over the moronic French war to prevent Vietnam from becoming a nation state. All during this effort, the US failed to understand that its policy of fighting communism had only limited relevance in the local context — where (right or wrong) a significant number of Vietnamese were ready to die fighting the US in order to gain independence. It is rather offensive now to listen now to arguments that a lack of will on the US side was to “blame” for the failure in Vietnam (especially from a president who chose not to serve there). Over 13 years more than 50,000 US soldiers died in Vietnam, and countless more Vietnamese died due to this profound stupidity of ignoring local realities. It was not a lack of will but a failure to see what was going on that caused this tragedy. Take a look at what Mr. McNamara said about this if you have any doubt about this.
Vietnam has some limited relevance to Iraq because once again, the intervening power (the US) does not understand local realities. Rather than arguing from vague historical analogies, wouldn’t you agree that better understanding the Iraqi local incentives for pursuing their civil war should be our prime objective? These incentives as much as the number of US troops in Iraq will determine how many people will die over time.