By Otto Spijkers
The Power of Nightmares (BBC documentary) "explores how the idea that we are threatened by a hidden and organised terrorist network is an illusion. It is a myth that has spread unquestioned through politics, the security services and the international media. At the heart of the story are two groups: the American neo-conservatives and the radical Islamists. Both were idealists who were born out of the failure of the liberal dream to build a better world" (that’s taken from the BBC website). I guess most people know this documentary already (it is three years old), but those who do not: you can watch the documentary on Google video. See below for links. At the heart of the documentary is the ‘philosophy’ of Leo Strauss. In one sentence, Strauss’ ideas are (according to the documentary): people need strong myths and a common enemy in order to survive and restrain the individualism and moral relativism of liberalism. For an interesting blog-discussion of his ideas, see here. In the documentary, we see how this philosophy was applied by both American neo-conservatives and the radical Islamists. First they find a common enemy in the Soviets, which they both fight in Afghanistan. After the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan and the Soviet Union collapses, they both need a new enemy and turn against each other, thereby strengthening rather than weakening the other. After all, the ‘enemy myths’ of both neo-conservatives and radical Islamists now become reality. Again, one of the main battlefields is Afghanistan. The documentary criticizes the conspiracy theories of the neo-conservatives, who place all reality in a friend-enemy, good-evil dichotomy. Interestingly, the documentary itself interprets all the facts of reality to fit its own ‘grand theory’, thereby making a similar error (as pointed out in a letter to the Guardian, see here). As with most ‘grand theories’, it is just one way of interpreting an enormous amount of historical facts. But it is an interesting interpretation, controversial enough to raise over 3000 comments on BBC’s website alone. Especially the suggestion that the threat of organized terror is an illusion has provoked. The documentary was finished before the London bombings, and it in fact ridicules the idea of Islamists plotting terrorist acts in the United Kingdom, especially in Part III. Didn’t these bombings show that the terrorist threat was in fact real and not an illusion after all? The author of the documentary gave the following answer:
Although there was a serious terrorist threat, the films criticised the apocalyptic vision of what lay behind it – the "nightmare" of a uniquely powerful network, unlike any previous terrorist danger and capable of overwhelming our society and our democracy. The Power of Nightmares said bluntly that this was a fantasy. The real threat came not from a network, but from individuals and groups linked only by an idea. Our energies were going into fighting a phantom enemy. We were looking for a network that didn’t exist when we should have been dealing with an idea that does. The evidence we have of what lies behind the London bombings confirms that this was the real nature of the threat. It is fascinating to see how suddenly all the terror "experts" have changed their tune. For three years they told us breathlessly about a terrifying global network. Now, suddenly, it has gone away and been replaced by "an evil ideology" that inspires young, angry Muslim males in our own society. It is good that we now all agree on the nature of the threat, but there remains a danger that the "idea" will be simplified, exaggerated and distorted just as the "network" was, and that in this mood of fear the government will bring in policies that will alienate young Muslims further and drive them towards dangerous extremism.
– Otto.
I think the invasion of Iraq was always about terrorism. The reason the Americans were worried about Saddam’s WMDs was not that he would HE would attack Washington with them, but that he would sell them to terrorists. Why? Because he’d been a long time supporter of terrorism. For more info check out this well-sourced site http://www.husseinandterror.com/
There is no evidence to support his links to Al-Qaeda but after 9/11 the Americans were taking no chances with people who had bad reputations and histories of violence…
Hi Otto
As a factual matter, I think you are right. Saddam was not in bed with Al Qaeda. Saddam was also not likely behind a lot of the mischief that was going on at that time. Moreover, the context for the US invasion was directly linked to the long history of Saddam thumbing his nose at the Security Council. Having said that, I do believe that the strategic thinking in the Bush Administration behind the invasion had little to do with Saddam or the UN. It was more related to the idea that Saddam was an easy target and a friendly Iraq could be a strategic asset in the war against terrorism. Call it denial of potential bases of operation, or recruitment of Arab allies or whatever. But I think the US used Saddam’s long term nastiness with the UN as pretext and invaded Iraq as part of its strategy to fight terrorism. Oops! Hasn’t worked out that way so far.
Hello Michael,
You say that the US intervened in both Afghanistan and Iraq as part of its fear of terrorism. But is that really true? I must insist: Iraq only became part of the war on terror after the failure to find weapons of mass-destruction. Before that failure, the military intervention was justified as an exercise of (preventive) self-defence, or as an intervention based on a Security Council resolution (resolution 1441 of 2002).
Richard also argued that both the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq were wars against terrorism, and that the plan has been to prevent either country being used as a safe harbour by terrorists. That may be true for the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, but it is certainly not true for the Iraq war of 2003. Perhaps it is true now, because the chaos in Iraq has provided a safe harbour for terrorists. Saddam Hussein, however, did not provide such a safe harbour.
Hi Otto
Well, I am not so sure. I think there are reasons why discussions about the “nightmare” of terrorist networks are related to discussions about Iraq and Vietnam. The US intervened in Vietnam due to a fear of communism (not out of any love for the Vietnamese people). The US intervened in both Afghanistan and Iraq as part of its fear of terrorism. The justification in all of these cases relates to fear of a “nightmare” — communist or terrorist take over or manipulation of state apparatus. “Membership” in Al Qaeda therefore might be similar in this sense to communist party membership during the cold war.
I think there are lessons to learn from how people discussed (and fought) communism compared with how we discuss (and fight) terrorism. One (but only one) context is how to deal with insurgency (as in Vietnam or Iraq or Afghanistan). I agree, this belongs to the other thread. A related issue, however, is how do we fight terrorism as an idea.
Hmmm. There are many parallels (arresting communists, disrupting their networks, propaganda wars, and so on). But I think it is important to reflect whether there are there peaceful strategies that worked back then that could work now. Looking back, we would likely agree that the outcome of the Vietnam War (while it was a tragedy) had little to do with ending the cold war. In 50 years, will our children say sonething similar about Iraq and ending the war against terrorism? Or will they still be fighting that war? I wonder.
Hello Michael,
I guess we have already continued this discussion in relation to the latest post by Richard. However, I would suggest distinguishing the fight against Al Qaeda and the war in Iraq. I don’t see how you can compare the fight against terrorism with the war in Vietnam. Iraq and Vietnam you can compare, as Richard does; the “war against terrorism” is a different category.
A follow up – President Bush argues that the key strategic question facing the US is whether it has the will to continue fighting the terrorist network (Al Qaeda) in Iraq, or if the US will give up (as it did in Vietnam). For a rather spirited critique of this argument check out
http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2007/08/by-hilzoy-once-.html
Ouch!
Actually, I think the threat from terrorism will persist because the reasons for terrorism persist whether there is a terrorist network, networks or not.
Can we separate fact and fiction?. Fact – 9/11 was the result of coordination and planning undertaken through an established terrorist network. This and other networks had plans to do more, and did more. Fact – there are individuals who have sympathies with the ?terrorist agenda”, and pose a threat whether they are recruited into networks or not. Fact – the Bush Administration has acted strategically, for example, eliminating terrorist networks that had their origin in the ugly alliance between Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Fact – the Bush Administration argued that invading Iraq would further disrupt the terrorist network. Fact – the Bush Administration also has used the fear of terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda for its own political ends.
So where does this leave us? We cannot say for sure whether and to what extent terrorist networks are still functioning and dangerous. My guess is that intelligence agencies know a lot more about them than they did before 9/11, and that they have been able to disrupt network activities to a certain degree. At this stage, I for one would be pretty angry if they do not and have not. At the same time, I would bet that these networks still have some resources left on the ground. How much, how dangerous? Ask the director of the CIA. Equally important, we also do not know how dangerous are crazed individuals who may lash out on their own or in small groups, and how easily they may be recruited or provoked into action.
So, I disagree that the threat from terrorist networks is a fraud.. They have posed a real threat, and could still. At the same time, I think that the Bush Administration has made it appear that the war against terrorism can be ?won” by killing a defined group of bad guys (terrorists) – i.e. destroying the network. We may be successful in killing certain bad guys, while provoking others to replace them, and making violent fundamentalism a form of ongoing spastic urban guerilla warfare. This is why I would argue that while we go ahead and kill bad guys we also reflect why people use terrorist tactics, and incorporate this thinking into a strategy to make the use of this tactic less attractive. Then terrorism may subside.
Well, yes… But do you agree with the assessment of the documentary? Do you really believe that the terrorist network is an illusion? And, more importantly, do you really believe that the United States government benefits from sustaining this illusion, in the sense that ‘we’ now have a common enemy? In what sense to they benefit? In the sense that the individualism of the American people is constrained, in the sense that the Democrats (‘the real enemy’) are constrained? That just sounds ridiculous. It all reminds me a bit of Carl Schmitt’s theory of ‘us against them’ or ‘friend and enemy’, and it may simply be wrong. (I think it is wrong; appealing perhaps, but wrong.)
Nice Post Otto! At this stage it is a truism that the “war against terrorism” is a war against a tactic. At some point, the west may begin to address why people use this tactic rather than obsessively focus on the tactic itself.