By Otto Spijkers

The second Secretary-General in UN history, the Swede Dag Hammarskjold, explored the three bedrock principles of traditional peacekeeping in a report he wrote for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed in Egypt between November 1957 and June 1967 (this picture and the picture below shows UNEF peacekeepers on duty). This is the report. First principle of traditional peacekeeping: Impartiality About impartiality, the first principle, the SG wrote the following:

As a matter of course, the United Nations personnel cannot be permitted in any sense to be a party to internal conflicts. Their role must be limited to external aspects of the political situation as, for example, infiltration or other activities affecting international boundaries. Even in the case of UNEF, where the United Nations itself had taken a stand on decisive elements in the situation which gave rise to the creation of the Force, it was explicitly stated that the Force should not be used to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution. (Source: Paragraph 166/167 of UN Doc A/3943, of 9 October, 1958; that is the report you can download by clicking the link in the introduction.)

The quote shows that there are two aspects to impartiality: an internal and an external aspect. A traditional United Nations peacekeeping mission is never allowed to get involved in internal conflicts, not even if it has the consent of the central government. It is important to emphasize this point. Clearly Hammarskjold has article 2(7) of the Charter in mind here, which says that ‘[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. Article 2(7) continues by allowing one exception to this rule, namely that ‘this principle [that the UN cannot interfere in domestic matters] shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’. The problem with traditional peacekeeping, however, is that it is not authorized under Chapter VII, and thus the exception does not apply. This means that traditional peacekeeping missions can never get involved in a domestic conflict such as a civil war. In the Congo operation of 1960 (ONUC), the UN already departed from this strict interpretation of impartiality by assisting the central government in fighting the Katanga secessionists of Tshombe. But that was only after Hammarskjold died. On the external aspect SG Hammarskjold is just as rigidly accurate as he is on the internal aspect. He says that even in external conflicts, the UN Peacekeepers cannot choose sides, not even if the United Nations (i.e. the world community) has a clear view of who is to blame for the outbreak of the conflict. Peacekeepers simply function as a human wall, to separate the warring parties. The reason for the external aspect of the principle of impartiality is that peacekeeping, i.e. a lightly armed buffer between warring fractions, only works if it does not choose sides. Second principle of traditional peacekeeping: Consent This is what Hammarskjold’s report says about consent:

As the arrangements discussed in this report do not cover the type of force envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter, it follows from international law and the Charter that the United Nations cannot undertake to implement them by stationing units on a territory of a Member State without the consent of the Government concerned. (Paragraph 155 of UN Doc A/3943 9 October, 1958.)

The legal reason for the consent-criterion is, I believe, as follows: states are free to do whatever they want, especially on their own territory, as long as they do not violate international law. This follows from the principle of sovereignty, and sovereignty is the first principle mentioned in Article 2 of the UN Charter: ‘the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’. If a state wants a peacekeeping mission established on its territory, then the United Nations is allowed to do so. If a state does not want such a mission on its territory, then the non-consenting state can only be forced to acceptance by international law that is binding upon that state. The UN Charter is binding on most states, but there is no article in that Charter that allows the UN to place troops on a non-consenting state’s territory, except in the case Chapter VII is triggered, which is never the case in traditional peacekeeping. Thus consent of the state on whose territory the peacekeepers will operate is a legal necessity. Third principle of traditional peacekeeping: use of force restricted to self-defence And finally: the use of force. On the use of force, which comes down in traditional peacekeeping to a right of self-defence only, Mr. Hammarskjold writes the following:

It should be generally recognized that such a right [of self-defence] exists. However, in certain cases this right should be exercised under strictly defined conditions. [..] A reasonable definition [of self-defence] seems to have been established in the case of UNEF, where the rule is applied that men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms [..] The basic element involved is clearly the prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed force. (Source: Paragraph 179 of UN Doc A/3943 9 October, 1958.)

Peacekeepers may only defend themselves if they are the victim of an actual armed attack. Why must the rules for self-defence be so strict? It is remarkable that they seem very similar to the text of article 51 of the Charter, which is, of course, not directly relevant here. But it does indicate the legal ground for the rule: everybody is allowed to defend himself in case his or her life is threatened, even peacekeepers. When the SG compares the right to use force in a traditional peacekeeping mission with the right to use force in an enforcement mission authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter, Hammarskjold warns in his report that ‘a problem arises in this context because a wide interpretation of the right of self-defence might well blur the distinction between operations of the character discussed in this report and combat operations, which would require a decision under Chapter VII of the Charter’. Therefore, a strict interpretation of the right to self-defence is necessary to ensure that the impartial and non-violent character of the peacekeeping mission is safely secured. – Otto