By Richard Norman
Michael Ignatieff, currently the deputy leader of the Liberal party of Canada, reconsiders his initial position on the war in Iraq in this weekend’s New York Times Magazine:
Having left an academic post at Harvard in 2005 and returned home to Canada to enter political life, I keep revisiting the Iraq debacle, trying to understand exactly how the judgments I now have to make in the political arena need to improve on the ones I used to offer from the sidelines. I’ve learned that acquiring good judgment in politics starts with knowing when to admit your mistakes.
In private life, we pay the price of our own mistakes. In public life, a politician’s mistakes are first paid by others. Good judgment means understanding how to be responsible to those who pay the price of your decisions.
This piece, a follow-up to one written in the same magazine during the build up to the Iraq War–in which he stated his strong support–largely concerns itself with the differences between academic and political reality. Ignatieff is careful to make no positive foreign policy recommendations, though he does appear to have an inkling of the future:
The decision facing the United States over Iraq is paradigmatic of political judgment at its most difficult. Staying and leaving each have huge costs. One thing is clear: The costs of staying will be borne by Americans, while the cost of leaving will be mostly borne by Iraqis. That in itself suggests how American leaders are likely to decide the question.
Many American politicians have indeed already decided the question. For men like Barack Obama, Bill Richardson, and John Kerry, withdrawal of all American forces from Iraq should be completed as quickly as safely possible. During debates and in interviews they are often asked, And what will then happen to the people of Iraq, won’t there then be a bloodbath? The answer each gives to this irksome query shows the deep irresponsibility of their decision. Asked to consider the possibility of a bloodbath following the withdrawal of American troops, each answers:
Bloodbath? There already is a civil war! There already is a bloodbath!
Such a position shows a profound failure of imagination. It is very easy for things to become much much worse. By providing basic security in some regions and hunting down Al-Qaeda elements (responsible for the majority of car and truck bombings), American troops are currently the only thing standing between Iraq and anarchy. Senator Obama has even stated that preventing a genocide in Iraq is not a good enough reason to keep American troops there. In the Wall Street Journal, Senator Kerry argues that what happened after the American withdrawal after Vietnam really wasn’t as bad as a continuation of the war, with a quick side-step around the hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese (American allies) who suffered in reeducation camps after the Fall of Saigon or the millions forced to flee by boat or the million plus killed during the Cambodian genocide, all of which may well have been avoided had the Democratic Congress of the time continued to simply fund American allies in Saigon and Phnom Penh (no American forces required). President Bush and Senator McCain’s rhetoric–"We must fight them there, so they don’t follow us home"–is not convincing, but it is wrong for the right reasons. A better, less politically palatable reason for staying in Iraq is that when you invade a country and occupy it, you take responsibility for it. When you break it, you buy it. The United States has invested vast amounts of "blood and treasure" in an ill-conceived war; but the notion that because things have not gone according to plan, because the war is very costly, it is time to pull the finger out of the dam and let the bloody chips fall where they may, is the height of irresponsibility and political crassness. This is not President Bush’s war alone–though he is personally responsible for its ugliness–it was approved by Congress with the same evidence upon which the Executive Branch based its decisions, and it is fought by a volunteer army not the President’s personal guard. Some Democrats may attempt to take the low political road on the issue, but it is does not absolve them of the responsibility of providing security for Iraqis whose government they assembled improperly and incorrectly and whose society they restitched together with all the expertise of Dr Frankenstein. What makes calls for an immediate pull out all the more unfortunate is that there are increasing reports the security situation is improving. That alone should be motive enough to reconsider such an impetuous and potentially devastating action, if only for a few more months. Though the days of Wolfowitzian idealism are thankfully gone from Washington, they don’t seem to have been replaced with clarity or sense; instead, the politics of pure self-interest is on the march. -Richard
Hi Richard – I may be too easy on the dems, but sorry – I do not see any evidence that the Bush Administration has a strategy to jumpstart the Iraqi political process. Perhaps they are thinking about it, but good luck. Hence my sense that the surge is their best thinking so far on what to do.
From the NYT today –
“DES MOINES, Aug. 11 ? Even as they call for an end to the war and pledge to bring the troops home, the Democratic presidential candidates are setting out positions that could leave the United States engaged in Iraq for years.
John Edwards, the former North Carolina senator, would keep troops in the region to intervene in an Iraqi genocide and be prepared for military action if violence spills into other countries. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York would leave residual forces to fight terrorism and to stabilize the Kurdish region in the north. And Senator Barack Obama of Illinois would leave a military presence of as-yet unspecified size in Iraq to provide security for American personnel, fight terrorism and train Iraqis.
These positions and those of some rivals suggest that the Democratic bumper-sticker message of a quick end to the conflict ? however much it appeals to primary voters ? oversimplifies the problems likely to be inherited by the next commander in chief. Antiwar advocates have raised little challenge to such positions by Democrats.”
Perhaps everyone is getting smarter as we go forward (except me I guess)
Well, I absolutely agree that for life to improve the Iraqi government must become functional and that there is little or nothing the American military can do to make that happen (except improve basic security and provide breathing room). Will a more federal, partitioned Iraq be more politically wieldy? It is an attractive idea, but it sounds unlikely to happen as the Iraqi government can’t come to agreement on legislation far less rancorous, plus it opens up as many questions as it answers (resource distribution, potentially a great increase in ethnic cleansing, etc). It could only really be done by diktat, I think, and would probably be a violent affair. I think this is a goal for the Iraq of 2037.
But where I disagree more with you in your last post, is where I disagreed with you before: you’re too easy on the Democrats and too hard on Bush. You write, “The nightmare scenario that you suggest (an abrupt troop pull out in 6 to 8 months) is not on the political agenda.” I think that virtually all Democratic candidates would like to see this–they only differ on whether to leave a “residual” force or leave completely (like Richardson). Obama has said his first move as president would be to order plans for a phased withdrawal and that genocide in Iraq would not be a good reason to stay. I would say a large majority of Congressional Democrats would end the war immediately if they had the votes.
The Bush administration for all its incompetence and venality in the past is a somewhat different animal in 2007 then it was in 2005. Gates has replaced Rumsfeld, Petraeus has replaced Casey, and also now Mike McConnell (another smart professional guy) is director of National Intelligence. No one in the government believes the surge is the only answer; they believe it is the beginning of a new policy (based on Petraeus’ handbook on counter-insurgency) that will have to focus more on political progress as the fall approaches. This is a longterm project. They also talk a lot about how the US has made a commitment to its ally, Iraq, to stay as long as necessary. If the surge were causing MORE violence, if things continued to be getting bad, I would agree with you that throwing good money after bad money deserves reevaluation. But it looks like the surge is actually doing some good…In any respect, I believe Sen. Clinton will be elected president and won’t withdraw the troops (assuming incremental, grindingly slow progress, or better, is made between now and Jan 2009), so my only worry is Democrats in Congress who might be compelled to cut off funding as they did in 1974/75…
Consider the following blog from “EU Referendum” on British tactics in southern Iraq.
http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/2007/08/road-to-defeat.html
Like it or not, the British are handing over military control of Basra to the Shiites. It will be interesting to see what the Shiites do. I would guess that over time, this will strengthen the Shiite militias, who will use their enhanced capacities to fight more effectively with their Sunni foes. One step closer to de facto partition?
Well, let us hope then that General Patraeus is indeed a genius, understanding things that are too complex to explain to us poor idiots. To this idiot, it appears that he is implementing a strategy that was meant to be temporary, but that could only work if insurgents believe it is permanent. Thus, no one may discuss its end point, or any benchmarks for success. One gets the sinking feeling that the surge will always be a work in progress, continued mainly out of the fear that embracing any strategic alternatives would make things worse. But because it brings into play no political tools that would compel Iraqis to end their own wars, and because the insurgents have no reason to believe it will be permanent, I believe that the surge is a recipe for an exhausting stalemate at best.
So what to do? I agree that vast increasing the number of troops on the ground would help. One might recall that even before the invasion General Shinseki argued that estimates for the number of troops needed to stabilize Iraq were far too low. He was fired. This argument has been raised again and again after the invasion. But there have been no vast increases and there is not likely to be any now. To the contrary, the US cannot sustain the surge even as it is for long (because the Bush Administration chose to fight this war on the cheap), and under the present conditions I do not see any ?surge” of volunteers from other countries. So, wouldn’t you agree that (heaven forbid) the surge may fail anyway because it is not enough?
Again, so what to do? I would agree Richard, that accepting that the surge is not the answer does not mean that immediate withdrawal is the answer. And by the way, I think most US democrats would agree with this as well. The nightmare scenario that you suggest (an abrupt troop pull out in 6 to 8 months) is not on the political agenda. What is on the agenda is a demand for more honest policy discussion — benchmarks for success. The problem is that the Bush Administration refuses to enter into this dialogue, and as usual, falls back on fear mongering to stifle it. Indeed, they are trapped by their own past rhetoric — the surge will work because General Patraeus is a genius.
I would argue that two conditions must be met before the Iraqi insurgency will be defeated. First, Iraqis must believe that the insurgents are doomed to fail (otherwise, they will hedge their bets and remain passive). Second, Iraqi political process must start generating policy (other Iraq will remain a protectorate at best a la Kosovo).
Coordinated military and police work are needed to bring about the first condition. But I would argue that the US cannot do this alone. There should be instead an ever broadening international coalition that supports this. But even though people fear that genocide may occur, the US has failed to build a credible coalition that supports this policy. Indeed, this administration does not have the credibility to do so (nor does it even appear to be trying). The next administration will have this as policy priority number 1 (and yes, Democrats appear interested to pursue this objective). Rejecting current policy rhetoric, however, may be a pre-condition for the next administration to develop the credibility to build such a coalition. Things are that bad.
But the question still remains, how to jump start Iraqi policy making? I think we can agree that promoting development of a democratic central authority in Baghdad has not been a great success. I would argue that at least part of the strength in the insurgency flows from the belief that the US remains committed to fostering this mess. If the problem is a lack of coherence from Baghdad, how does one promote more coherent political institution building? Would accepting a de facto partition, where regional authorities are the main power brokers be more coherent? The Kurds seem to be well down this path already (despite Turkish anxieties). But this would require (among other things) a concerted diplomatic effort that would bring in Arab Sunni support for a Sunni rump state. Possible? Who knows? Any better ideas? I haven’t heard any — especially from the Bush Administration.
Ah well, we swim in a sea of difficult strategic questions. None are easily answered — and none can be answered at all — until the US gets beyond the rather bizarre sense that the surge is the answer. Sorry General Patraeus, I think it is not responsible or imaginative to think so. Thus, why not admit it, and move on? I think this is what US democrats will do when they are elected. Then I guess General Patraeus will say he supported them all along, and we can all be responsible and imaginative together.
I don’t disagree with your view of how bad things are in Iraq and your view that Iraqi elites may well be playing a double game. Nor do I disagree with your argument that this is a war the United States cannot win militarily. What you left out in your comment was a discussion of the central point of my post:
The idea that withdrawing all troops within the next 6-8 months would mostly likely cause catastrophic violence (the likes of which have not been seen so far). That is the policy that I am calling irresponsible. I don’t think it is “devoid of imagination” to believe
the American military is a band aid on an infected wound–I myself believe that. And I think the band-aid buys time. One of the reasons why things are so bad politically in Iraq is because of the lack of security. I think that if the security situation can be turned around, then the political process can begin to be turned around. Obviously, this will all take many years to do. The alternative (which you avoid mentioning in your comment) is yanking the bandaid off the patient and ensuring they immediately most likely die. As long as
there is a chance for things to be turned around (and indeed it is beginning to look like there might now be a chance for security to improve) then the US has a responsibility–a moral imperative–to do everything it can. My prescription is more troops, more surge, more regional conferences, more buying time. The alternative is to give up, the consequences of which would be disastrous (do you disagree with this assertion?)
As for Al-Qaeda, you make a popular argument–fighting them causes them to fight us more, so we shouldn’t fight them. I don’t get it. So the Americans should just go home and stop fighting them, and then everything will be good? This is a strange way to think about war–can you give me some examples of wars where one side gave up in the middle of a pitched battle and lived to tell the tale?
There may well be ways to fight more intelligently and more precisely, but leaving Iraq now may well allow Al-Qaeda elements to take control of the country. Faced with the situation as it is now (small sliver of hope that security might improve) and the situation as it mostly likely will be following a complete withdrawal, I would definitely choose the former.
As for UN or EU soldiers/peacekeepers in Iraq, the chances of that happening, even if President Bush visited Brussels and promised to change the American anthem to La Marseillaise in exchange for help, are nil. Most NATO allies can’t even lend a helicopter to fight in the “good” war in Afghanistan…
Ah, Richard! How could you miss the main point of the political debate about Iraq in the US? It is brutally simple. The Iraqi political elite has chosen infighting over nation building. This has created a rather large power vacuum (that despite heroic efforts, the US military has not been able to fill). The ongoing presence of the US military in Iraq serves as a rather small band aid over a large and infected wound. Is it ?irresponsible” and ?devoid of imagination” to admit this? I think it is just being honest.
What strategic options would you offer for filling the Iraqi power vacuum? Is it just that more time is needed for the surge to ?work”? But why is ?time” the problem at all? Is it because the Iraqi political elite needs more time to gain the inspiration in order to reach political compromises? Thus, did the Sunnis who just walked out of the governing coalition do so out of nation building concerns? Are they heroes? If not, will the surge bring them back? Or perhaps the summer vacation that the Iraqi parliament has taken was needed to refresh the grey cells of overloaded parliamentarians, and the surge can sustain the situation while they rest. If so, we await their return then with great expectations.
If the surge is not motivating or inspiring the Iraqi political elites, perhaps more time is needed so that it will eventually wear out the opposition to nation building. This seems to be the main hope of the US military (a protectorate mentality). You also seem to think that the problem is mainly just “hunting down Al-Qaeda elements”. Hmmm.
One wonders why providing security has proved to be so difficult over the years. If the opposition to Iraqi nation building really is just a collection of foreign Al-Qaeda lunatics, isn’t it equally likely that the continued US troop presence gives them (outside Iraq) an excellent recruiting slogan to find more and more idiots to blow themselves and others up in Iraq now (and elsewhere later)? If so, could it be that “hunting them down” will prove to be an endless task, and that the US troop presence instead may be strengthening rather than weakening violent Islamic fundamentalism overall (unless the US manages to kill or terrify all who adhere to this way of thinking)? Anyway, one wonders why local Iraqis cannot just kill off the foreign lunatics themselves. The foreigners do not appear to outnumber the locals. Perhaps it is because some locals are also infected with violent fundamentalist lunacy. If this were the main problem, one would have expected long ago that a sane moderate majority would have emerged in order to end the appalling violence. Yet this has not happened. Why not? Is everyone in Iraq loony? Are only the “bad guys” empowered? I think not.
Could it be instead that local political elites are using the foreign lunatics as much as they are using US military presence for their own local political purposes? If so, we should admit that endless US troop presence is not the solution to the nation building puzzle. Without something to fight for, the occupation becomes the problem. Security may improve in a transient way, but horrid violence will fester. The solution instead is local (Iraqi) and political, backed by military, not military alone backed by wishful thinking from Washington. Or, if preventing genocide is the main concern, and preventing it is beyond the ability of those involved, it should be an international effort rather than just a US problem. Contrary to your argument, I think this reflects the mood of democrats (and many others) in the US who are fed up with the superficial argumentation about the Iraqi insurgency.
So, Richard, please inform me, where is your imaginative and responsible political solution? A patchwork of alliances between sheiks? Partition? Or, if you believe that the solution is primarily military, and if the US proves to be too weak to continue, would you advocate for Europeans to replace US forces in Iraq? It would be an ironic twist, when one reflects how the US replaced the French in Vietnam. Perhaps this would be another signal that Europe is renewing itself.